By Anuradha Gandhi and Rishabh Gupta<\/p>\n
Introduction<\/p>\n
In an era where workplaces are rightly held to higher standards of decorum and sensitivity, courts are increasingly called upon to draw a difficult but essential line i.e. between conduct that is genuinely sexually harassing and conduct that is merely unprofessional or rude. The Hon\u2019ble Punjab and Haryana High Court\u2019s recent decision in Abhikshek Shah v. State of Haryana<\/em><\/strong> [1]<\/a>squarely confronts this question. The judgment, rendered by Justice Kirti Singh on April 18, 2026, quashes an FIR filed under Section 354-A Indian Penal Code, 1860 (now Section 75 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) against a company Director who used the phrase \u201cf*** off\u201d during an email exchange with a former employee.<\/p>\n The Petitioner in this case is a Director of a Company. The Complainant had been employed as a Business Manager (North) since March 2018. In October 2018, ahead of an important company event, the complainant requested four days of medical leave on short notice. The petitioner responded by requesting that she reschedule the procedure. A heated email exchange followed, during which the petitioner used the words \u201cf*** off.\u201d The complainant subsequently resigned. Her resignation was accepted, post-which her official email ID was suspended. It was clarified to the Complainant that since she has left the job without any prior notice, therefore as per the terms of letter of appointment, two months\u2019 salary was the compensation due to the company, however, the Complainant was offered a clear exit, keeping in mind the reputation of the Company. Thereafter, a legal notice was issued to the Complainant to discard all information related to the Company and not to engage or deal with the clients of the Company. In reply to the said legal notice, the Complainant raised a claim of salary for the period of 17 days for the month of October 2018 along with 2 months\u2019 notice period salary. In response of the Company, the Complainant was called upon to comply with the legal notice regarding breach of contact. About 4 months later from her resignation, the Complainant filed an FIR against the Petitioner under section 354-A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (now Section 75 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) for alleged harassment and use of derogatory and abusive language.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Section 354-A of the Indian Penal Code, inserted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, defines sexual harassment to include four categories of conduct:<\/p>\n The punishment for the first three categories extends to rigorous imprisonment of up to three years, while the fourth, making sexually coloured remarks, carries up to one year\u2019s imprisonment or fine.[2]<\/a><\/p>\n The Petitioner argued that the emails exchanged between the parties sufficiently reveals that there was only a mild verbal spat between the parties, whereby the Complainant threatened to resign from her assignment and during the course of the said conversation, the Petitioner used the words \u201cf******\u201d. The Petitioner argued that the said remarks though not made in good taste, must not be taken in isolation and should be read as part of the entire conversation whereby the Complainant was seeking exemption from an important event of the Company at the last minute for a procedure which did not require immediate medical intervention.<\/p>\n Further, it was argued that, there were no overt allegations of unwelcome sexual advances or physical contact or sexual favours, hence, section 354A-IPC would not be applicable in the present case.<\/p>\n The Respondent contented that the remarks \u201cf******\u201d was a sexually-coloured remark within the meaning of Section 354A IPC (now Section 75 of BNS, 2023). Further, the Petitioner had misused his position as a Director of the Company and subjected her to harassment and humiliation.<\/p>\n The singular moot point for consideration before the High Court was whether the allegations in the FIR, disclose the essential ingredients of Section 354-A IPC (now Section 75 of BNS 2023) \u00a0so as to justify continuation of criminal proceedings.<\/p>\n The Hon\u2019ble Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that the use of the expressions \u201cf******\u201d during workplace dispute, though inappropriate, does not amount to sexual harassment in the absence of sexual intent or overtone. The Court explained that \u2013<\/p>\n It would be a grave misreading of this judgment to treat it as a license for workplace profanity or as weakening protections against sexual harassment. The Court was careful to note that \u201cthe standards of decorum ought to be maintained in every such correspondence<\/strong>.\u201d The petitioner\u2019s conduct was described as \u201cundeniably uncouth and discourteous<\/strong>.\u201d<\/p>\n The judgment does not hold that abusive language in the workplace is permissible. It holds only that not all workplace misconduct, however offensive, amounts to sexual harassment under Section 354-A IPC.<\/p>\n The distinction between criminal liability and workplace misconduct is, however, not a distinction between consequence and impunity. Offensive and degrading language directed at women remains actionable under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act). For a closer examination of how calling offensive names and verbal abuse against women are treated as misconduct under workplace law, kindly refer our article:<\/p>\n https:\/\/ssrana.in\/posh-law\/articles\/calling-women-offensive-names-is-workplace-misconduct\/<\/a><\/p>\n https:\/\/ssrana.in\/posh-law\/articles\/calling-a-woman-ri-amounts-to-offence-of-insulting-her-modesty<\/a><\/p>\nFacts in Brief<\/h2>\n
What Does Section 354A IPC (now Section 75 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) Says?<\/h3>\n
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Contentions of the Petitioner<\/h3>\n
Contentions of Respondent<\/h3>\n
Legal Question before the Hon\u2019ble High Court <\/h3>\n
Decision of the Court<\/h3>\n
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\nThe Court explained that the context of the communication in this case arose out of a work-related interaction. The Parties had a disagreement regarding the issue of leave, which led to these remarks. \u201cThe same, though undeniably uncouth and discourteous, does not, in its ordinary sense carry any sexual overtone or insinuation, directed at the modesty or sexuality of the complainant.<\/em>\n<\/li>\n
\nNo doubt the standards of decorum ought to be maintained in every such correspondence, yet at the same time, a solitary instance of an abusive remark, in the absence of any element of sexual intent or pattern of conduct, would not meet the threshold of criminal culpability under the penal provision intended to address gender-based harassment.\u201d<\/em>\n<\/li>\n
\nThe Court accordingly held that the essential ingredients of Section 354A IPC, 1860 (now Section 75 of BNS, 2023) were not made out. Permitting criminal proceedings to continue in such circumstances would serve no useful purpose and would, on the contrary, constitute an abuse of the process of law. The Court therefore quashed the proceedings.\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\nConclusion<\/h3>\n