By Anuradha Gandhi and Isha Sharma<\/p>\n
Introduction<\/p>\n
The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 also commonly known as the POSH Act establishes a clear framework for addressing complaints of sexual harassment at the workplace through two redressal mechanisms.<\/p>\n
The first is the Internal Committee (IC) which is required to be constituted by every employer at a workplace employing 10 or more employees.<\/p>\n
The second is the Local Committee (LC) constituted by the District Officer under Section 6 of the POSH Act.<\/p>\n
Section 6 (1) of the POSH Act empowers the LC to receive and inquire into complaints in two specific situations:<\/p>\n
While these provisions may appear straightforward, a practical question often arises: Who exactly qualifies as an \u201cemployer\u201d under the POSH Act?<\/p>\n
More specifically, what happens when allegations of sexual harassment are made against the Director of an Institution?<\/p>\n
A recent judgment of the Hon\u2019ble High Court of Kerala provides valuable insight on these nuanced questions and sheds light on the difference between an \u201cEmployee\u201d and an \u201cEmployer\u201d under the POSH Act.[1]<\/a><\/p>\n The case arose from a writ appeal filed by the appellant, a retired Senior Principal Scientist of CSIR, New Delhi, who was associated with the Integrated Rural Technology Centre (IRTC) as its Director. [2]<\/a><\/p>\n On November 27, 2024 \u2013 a woman employee of IRTC lodged a complaint alleging sexual harassment against the appellant. Pursuant to the complaint, the IC issued a notice directing him to appear before it for inquiry.<\/p>\n The appellant challenged the jurisdiction of the IC. Relying upon the definition of \u2018employer\u2019 under Section 2(g) of the POSH Act, he contended that since he was the Director, any complaint against him could only be entertained by the Local Committee (LC) constituted under Section 6(1) of the POSH Act.<\/p>\n The appellant therefore approached the District Collector seeking intervention in the matter. Further, he alleged a conflict of interest involving the Presiding Officer\/Chairperson of the IC and claimed that the complainant was acting out of personal animosity. Consequently, he filed a writ petition seeking<\/p>\n After considering the submissions and materials on record, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition vide judgment dated January 06, 2026.<\/p>\n Aggrieved by the same, the appellant preferred the present writ appeal before the Hon\u2019ble Kerala High Court.<\/p>\n The Court was called upon to determine:<\/p>\n While examining the matter, the Court undertook a detailed analysis of the provisions of the POSH Act along with the Memorandum of Association and Rules governing IRTC.<\/p>\n The court observed that in accordance with the provisions outlined under the Memorandum of Association of IRTC, the overall administration, management and control of the affairs of IRTC vested with its General Body and Executive Committee and not with the Director. Further, it makes it clear that the overall management of the affairs of IRTC by the Director is subject to the supervision and control of the Executive Committee and the General Body and was appointed by the Executive Committee of IRTC.<\/p>\n These facts become crucial in determining whether the appellant could be regarded as \u201cEmployer\u201d or not.<\/p>\n The court reiterated the statutory scheme under the POSH Act:<\/p>\n \u201cThe combined reading of Sections 4, 6 and 9 of the POSH Act would make it clear that if a complaint of sexual harassment is raised by an employee in the workplace from the hands of another employee, then the matter has to be enquired into by the IC.\u201d[4]<\/a><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n Thus, upon examining the organizational structure of IRTC, the court concluded that the appellant, despite holding the position of Director, was not the ultimate authority controlling the institution. Rather, he functioned under the authority of the Executive Committee and General Body.<\/p>\n Accordingly, the court held that the appellant could only be treated as an employee in IRTC and therefore the IC has the authority to receive and inquire about the complaint raised against the appellant.<\/p>\n The Hon\u2019ble Kerala High Court upheld the findings of the learned Single Judge and held that the IC possessed the necessary jurisdiction to receive and inquire into complaints of sexual harassment filed against the appellant vide order dated May 19, 2026.<\/p>\n Since the appellant was functioning under the supervision and control of higher governing bodies and was himself appointed by the Executive Committee, he could not claim the status of \u201cEmployer\u201d merely by virtue of being designated as Director.<\/p>\n \u201cHaving considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar, we find no ground to hold the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge as perverse or patently illegal, which warrants interference by exercising appellate jurisdiction. In the result, the writ appeal stands dismissed,\u201d the court remarked.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n Thus, this judgment highlights an important principle that merely holding a senior position or serving as the Director of an organization does not automatically make an individual the \u201cemployer\u201d under the POSH Act. The determination depends on the authority, governance structure of the organization and the degree of control exercised over the individual concerned.<\/p>\n The Kerala High Court\u2019s decision is not an isolated one. Courts across the country have repeatedly grappled with the question of who qualifies as an \u2018Employer\u2019 under the POSH Act and whether senior officials can invoke that status to challenge the jurisdiction of the IC.<\/p>\n This emerging jurisprudence suggests that answer depends less on designation and more on the actual structure of authority, accountability and control within an organization.<\/p>\n Looking beyond Designations<\/p>\n In Jaya Kodate vs. Rashtrasant Tukadohi Maharaj Nagpur Univeristy & Ors- High Court of Bombay (Nagpur Bench)<\/em><\/strong>, complaints of sexual harassment were filed by three female Assistant Professors of a college professors\/teachers against senior functionaries of a college, including the President and Secretary\/Head of the Department and Principal of that college. The respondents argued that by virtue of their positions, they were \u2018employers\u2019 under the POSH Act and therefore any complaint against them could only be entertained by LC. The Court, however, adopted a purposive interpretation of the Act. It observed that the term \u2018employer\u2019 appears to be a very small field and all those working in various capacities either managerial, administrative or supervisory, whether they derive some benefit or then work even voluntarily, if are answerable for any lapse or wrong on their part to the management, will be covered under the phrase \u201cemployee\u201d.<\/p>\n The court further emphasized that \u201cconcept of either employee or employer as defined must be understood in a way conducive to further the object of enactment and unless otherwise necessitated, in favour of Aggrieved Woman. The concept of Employer, viewed from the perspective of Respondent, shall occupy a very narrow field and will include such of the respondents who do not fit in definition of employee.<\/em><\/strong>\u201d<\/p>\n Since the respondents were themselves answerable to the higher authorities within the institutional hierarchy, the court held that they could be treated as \u2018employees\u2019 for the purpose of the Act, thereby bringing them within the jurisdiction of the Internal Committee.<\/p>\n Risk of Influence over the Internal Committee<\/p>\n A similar approach was adopted in the case Dr. David G Samuel vs. Collector\/District Magistrate, Pune & Ors.- High Court of Bombay[5]<\/a><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n In this case, a complaint of sexual harassment was filed before the IC against the President of the Governing Board of Trustees of the Union Biblical Seminary (UBS). The Respondent challenged the constitution of the IC claiming that that the Respondent in his capacity as President of the Trust is the employer and therefore the IC lacked jurisdiction.<\/p>\n Rejecting this contention, the Court observed that the Trust was also a registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and the business affairs of the society were carried on and managed by the Governing Body, which consists of 11 members. That is to say, it is no individual who is solely responsible for the governance of the institution. The President exercises only such powers and performs such duties as may be \u2018imposed\u2019 by the Rules and Regulations or determined by the Governing Body or the society. In other words, the President is not, by virtue of his office, solely in charge of the management, supervision and control of the working place. <\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n Thus, in view of the same, the respondent could not therefore claim the status of \u2018employer\u2019 merely by virtue of his position as the President.<\/p>\n The Court further made an important observation regarding the legislative intent behind referring complaints against employers to the Local Committee. The objective, it noted, is not to shield the person accused of harassment in the workplace but to prevent a situation where the person accused of harassment is in a position to influence or control the Internal Committee, thereby rendering the inquiry ineffective or meaningless. Accordingly, the court upheld the jurisdiction of the IC to proceed with the complaint.<\/p>\n Broader Interpretation of Employer<\/p>\n However, in the case X vs. Akademi and Ors- High Court of Delhi<\/em>[6]<\/a><\/strong> accorded a broader interpretation to the term \u201cemployer\u201d.<\/p>\n The Respondent, who held the position of Secretary, herein contended that he was himself an appointee of the Executive Board, functioning under the control of the President and therefore cannot be treated as the \u201cemployer\u201d within the meaning of Section 2(g). According to him, it is the President, as head of the Executive Board, who alone qualifies as \u201cemployer\u201d for the purposes of the POSH Act.<\/p>\n The court opined that the term \u201cemployer\u201d under Section 2(g) cannot be construed in a narrow, formalistic manner. The definition of employer is deliberately cast in wide terms to ensure accountability of those in positions of authority-whether that authority is derived from the organization\u2019s governing instruments\/framework or from de facto or effective control over the workplace.<\/p>\n The court found that the Respondent, was in practice responsible for the day-today management and administration of the workplace where the aggrieved woman was employed. Considering the extent of authority exercised by him and his effective control over the functioning of the establishment, the court held that he would fall within the ambit of \u2018employer; under the POSH Act.<\/p>\n These decisions collectively demonstrate that there is no straight-jacket formula for determining who is an \u2018Employer\u2019 under the POSH Act.<\/p>\n Courts have consistently looked beyond titles\/designations and have instead examined:<\/p>\n Ultimately, the courts have sought to strike a balance between ensuring an impartial inquiry and advancing the fundamental objective of the POSH Act- providing an effective, accessible and meaningful redressal mechanism for women facing sexual harassment at the workplace.<\/p>\n This serves as a reminder that the substance of the role, rather than the title attached to it, will ultimately determine the appropriate forum under the POSH framework. [1] W.A. No. 534 of 2026 against the judgment dated 06.01.2026 in WP (C) No. 7354 of 2025 of the High Court of Kerala<\/p>\n [2] https:\/\/www.thehindu.com\/news\/national\/kerala\/icc-can-inquire-into-sexual-harassment-complaint-against-director-of-an-institution-hc\/article71003384.ece<\/a><\/p>\n [3] https:\/\/ssrana.in\/posh-law\/articles\/internal-committee-of-the-aggrieved-womans-workplace-has-jurisdiction-third-party-sexual-harassment\/<\/a><\/p>\n [4] https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/06\/04\/kerala-high-court-icc-jurisdiction-posh-act-director-employee\/<\/a><\/p>\nBackground of the Case<\/h2>\n
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Issues before the court<\/h3>\n
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Analysis of the Court<\/h3>\n
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Judgment<\/h3>\n
Drawing the Line: Who is an \u201cEmployer\u201d under the POSH Act?<\/h3>\n
Key Takeaways<\/h3>\n
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