By Vikrant Rana, Anuradha Gandhi and Isha Sharma
Introduction
The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act)[1] was enacted to ensure that no working woman remains without a mechanism to report sexual harassment. It is grounded in the landmark Vishaka Guidelines[2] and the statute intentionally defines “workplace” in broad terms, extending well beyond the confines of a traditional office. For nearly a decade since, the courts across India have interpreted the Act liberally, extending its protections to official residences, employer-sponsored events, digital communications, and even offices located in different physical locations cities.
Against this evolving backdrop, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court’s decision in Siddhesh Pradeep Satpute v. State Bank of India & Ors, presents an important question: When does the workplace end?
In a judgment delivered on June 16, 2026, the Division Bench quashed a ruling of an Internal Committee (IC) which had held an employee guilty of sexual harassment following an alleged occurrence in a shared auto rickshaw. The court quashed the order on the ground that the incident did not occur at a ‘workplace’ within the meaning of the POSH Act, because the transport had not been arranged or provided by the employer of either party.
What happened and What Followed
Facts of the Case
The petitioner an employee of the State Bank of India (SBI), was travelling from Kurla railway station to Bandra Kurla Complex (BKC) in a shared auto rickshaw- a routine commute undertaken using public transport.
The complainant, employed by another organization, happened to be travelling in the same auto rickshaw along with another passengers. According to the petitioner, in view of the crowded bumpy ride of the auto rickshaw due to the uneven condition of the road caused incidental physical contact.
The complainant, however, alleged that the petitioner had inappropriately touched her. The situation escalated when she stopped the vehicle, abruptly used pepper spray against the petitioner, called the police and criminal proceedings were initiated under Section 354A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Subsequently, she also lodged a sexual harassment complaint under the POSH Act against the petitioner before her employer’s Internal Committee (IC), which forwarded the complaint to the petitioner’s employer. Following an inquiry, the petitioner’s Internal Committee found him guilty of sexual harassment on August 29, 2023 and recommended disciplinary action under the bank’s service rules.
The petitioner filed an appeal against this order. He also challenged this order before the Bombay High Court through a writ petition, contending that the Internal Committee lacked jurisdiction because the alleged incident had not taken place at a ‘workplace’ within the meaning of the POSH Act. By an interim order dated December 18, 2023 passed in the writ petition, the High Court directed that no final order be passed in the appeal case without the leave of the Court.
The matter was accordingly adjudicated by the Bombay Court in the writ petition. Before discussing the merits of the case, the court also clarified why it allowed the present petition. It stated that although the petitioner had evoked alternate remedy by way of appeal, the issue raised was purely jurisdictional and the Court in such cases, is not obliged to relegate the petitioner to alternate remedy as has been established through practice. The following sections outline the process, rationale, and examination of the judgment’s implications for the legal profession.
The Core Legal Issue
Does an alleged incident occurring during an employee’s commute in shared public transport amount to sexual harassment ‘at the workplace’ under the POSH Act?
How the Courts Interpreted ‘Workplace’
Section 2(o)- Definition of Workplace
The answer depended upon the interpretation of Section 2(o) of the POSH Act, which defines the term ’workplace’[3]. It includes offices, hospitals, educational institutions, sports facilities, private residences, and even virtual spaces when used as work environments. In the current case, Sub clause (v) of Section 2(o) was specifically under consideration, which states the following:
“…any place visited by the employee arising out of or during the course of employment including transportation provided by the employer for undertaking such journey.”
Read plainly, this provision has two parts.
The first part or the general limb covers any place visited by an employee in the course of her/his employment.
The second part specifically mentions transportation provided by the employer.
The courts’ approach to the definition of workplace before this matter had been consistently expansive. In the case of Saurabh Kumar Mallick v. CAG of India[4], the Delhi High Court refused to confine ‘workplace’ to the physical office, holding that an official residential mess fell within the extended workplace. Similarly, in Gaurav Jain v. Hindustan Latex[5], an employer-sponsored off-site event was held to be a workplace even though it took place entirely outside the office premises. Further, in the case of Jahid Ali v. Union of India[6], the Delhi High Court held that harassment within the context of a professional or hierarchical relationship transcends the medium of communication, and that digital platforms used for employment-related interaction fall squarely within the workplace definition under Section 2(o).
More importantly, the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India[7], delivered just six months earlier took the most expansive position yet on the POSH Act. The Court here held that a narrow interpretation of the POSH Act i.e. one that defeats a complainant’s access to a forum undermines the remedial intent of the law. The Court stressed that ‘workplace’ carries a wide meaning covering any place visited during employment and that this breadth cannot be displaced by technical arguments.
The Division Bench in the present matter observed that the definition of workplace intentionally and specifically includes transportation provided by the employer within its scope.
The Court reasoned that this legislative choice cannot be ignored. If every mode of travel to and from work were automatically treated as a workplace, the words “provided by the employer” would become redundant. The Supreme Court in the case of Maharashtra University of Health Sciences v. Satchiktisa Prasarak Mandal [8]in fact clarified this position by holding that the legislature does not use words without meaning and that no word in a statute is to be treated as redundant or surplus.
Since the parties were travelling in a privately operated shared auto rickshaw and not in transportation arranged or provided by either employer, the journey did not fall within the statutory definition of ‘workplace’. Consequently, the IC lacked jurisdiction to inquire into the complaint.[9]
Jurisdiction comes before Merits
An equally significant aspect of the judgment is the Court’s emphasis on jurisdiction. as the IC has the mandate to take up matters falling within the workplace
The employer argued that the IC could first entertain the complaint and thereafter determine whether the incident fell within the definition of workplace.
Rejecting this contention, the Court held that jurisdiction is not something that can be assumed and examined later. The Committee must first satisfy itself that the alleged incident occurred at a workplace before embarking upon any inquiry on the merits. If the incident falls outside the statutory definition, the Committee cannot proceed further.
This reinforces a foundational principle of administrative and statutory adjudication: jurisdiction is a precondition to the exercise of power and that jurisdiction cannot be assumed and then validated retroactively by the outcome of the inquiry itself.
Conclusion
The judgment raises important questions about the scope of the POSH Act in ever expanding definitions of the workplaces.
For employers, the decision underscores the importance of examining jurisdiction before initiating POSH inquiries. IC cannot assume authority merely because the complainant or respondent is an employee. The alleged incident must have occurred within the statutory conception of a workplace.
At the same time, the judgment should not be misunderstood as leaving complainants without remedies. The Court itself recognized that allegations occurring outside the workplace may still be pursued through criminal law like Sections 74 and 79 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023[10] or other legally available forums. The decision concerns the forum, not the validity of the allegations.
Priyanka Bose, Former Intern at S.S. Rana & Co., has assisted in the research of this Article.
[1] The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, No. 14 of 2013.
[2] Vishaka & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 241.
[3] https://ssrana.in/posh-law/articles/facebook-whatsapp-is-workplace-under-posh-law-delhi-high-court/
[4] Saurabh Kumar Mallick v. Comptroller & Auditor General of India & Ors., WP(C) No. 8649/2006, Delhi High Court
[5] Gaurav Jain v. Hindustan Latex Family Planning Promotion Trust, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 11026.
[6] Jahid Ali v. Union of India 2017 Supreme(Del) 3893.
[7] Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India & Anr., 2025 INSC 1415, decided December 10, 2025 (J.K. Maheshwari and Vijay Bishnoi JJ.).
[8] Maharashtra University of Health Sciences v. Satchikitsa Prasarak Mandal (2010) 3 SCC 786.
[10] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Section 74 (assault or criminal force to outrage modesty) and Section 79 (stalking).