Razorpay SFIO Case: Payment Aggregator Director Liability
By Lucy Rana, Nihit Nagpal and Malay Misra
Companies Act, 2013 | SFIO | Fintech and Payments Regulation | Karnataka High Court | November 2026
In brief
What happened? On 4 November 2026, in Harshil Mathur v. Union of India (W.P. No. 16078 of 2026), the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru refused to quash a Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) complaint against two Razorpay directors under Section 166 of the Companies Act, 2013.
Were the directors held liable? No. The Court held only that whether the directors discharged their duties of care and diligence is a disputed question of fact for trial. It expressed no view on guilt.
What remains open? The reach of Section 212(14) over persons outside the investigation order, its relationship with Section 219, the content of director duties under Section 166, the applicable KYC standard at the relevant time, and the effect of Section 223 of the BNSS.
Why it matters: The case highlights how far payment aggregators and their boards in India may be expected to answer for merchant onboarding and transaction monitoring.
The High Court of Karnataka has declined to quash an SFIO complaint against two directors of Razorpay, one of India’s best-known payment aggregators, headquartered in Bengaluru. The order does not decide liability. It does, however, bring into focus three questions of lasting importance to the fintech and payments sector in India: how far the SFIO can reach beyond the companies named in an investigation order, what Section 166 of the Companies Act, 2013 requires of individual directors, and which merchant due diligence standard governs conduct at a given point in time.
As recorded in the order, the proceedings originated in a confidential report of the Registrar of Companies, said to have uncovered a network of shell companies with dummy directors created by Jilian Consultants India Private Limited (JCIPL), a wholly owned subsidiary of Fininty Private Limited. By an order dated 9 September 2022 under Section 212 of the Companies Act, the Central Government directed an investigation into JCIPL and 32 other companies. The SFIO report, placed before the Government on 31 July 2024, forms the basis of the complaint.
One of the 33 companies, Mad Elephant Network Technology Private Limited (MENTPL), was incorporated on 15 November 2019 through JCIPL, allegedly with dummy directors controlled by Chinese entities. It is said to have acted as a service provider for lending through digital platforms and mobile applications for X10 Financial Services Limited, a non-banking financial company. The complaint alleges predatory and coercive recovery practices that produced wrongful gains for MENTPL.
Razorpay is a payment aggregator regulated by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). It was not among the 33 companies under investigation, and it is not an accused. Its Whole Time Director, Harshil Mathur, and Managing Director, Shashank Kumar, are Accused Nos. 8 and 9 in Special C. No. 324 of 2026 pending before a Sessions Court in Bengaluru, cognizance having been taken on 5 March 2026. The allegations against them concern deficiencies in merchant onboarding, lapses in Know Your Customer (KYC) verification of MENTPL, and failure to conduct due diligence on and monitor MENTPL’s transactions. On that footing, the complaint alleges that the directors failed to exercise the care, skill, diligence and independent judgment required by Section 166.
The directors argued that Section 212 confines the SFIO to the affairs of the companies named in the investigation order; Razorpay was not named, and they are not officers of any investigated company. In their submission, providing payment services to an investigated company is not an act in connection with its affairs. They also contended that Section 166 cannot be invoked against directors where their company is not an accused, that negligence is not an offence, that criminal law does not recognise vicarious liability, and that KYC is primarily the duty of banks. They raised limitation and the absence of criminal intent, and, in the alternative, argued that cognizance taken after the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) came into force offended Section 223(1).
The Union of India, through the Additional Solicitor General, submitted that Section 212 has a wide amplitude and extends to persons and entities through whom a company’s affairs were conducted and its funds routed. It described Razorpay as a conduit for about ₹320 crore of MENTPL transactions, and argued that no mini trial can be conducted at the stage of cognizance.
Justice M. Nagaprasanna observed that the directors are arraigned under Section 166 on the footing that they owed a fiduciary duty, particularly given the sums involved. Whether that duty was complied with, and whether due diligence was done, is a disputed question of fact that can be examined only at trial. Relying on Kaptan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 9 SCC 35, and a 2025 Supreme Court decision on the limits of quashing jurisdiction, the Court held that under Section 528 of the BNSS it cannot conduct a mini trial or adjudicate disputed facts. It deferred the remaining submissions because the matter is at a nascent stage, noted that Razorpay itself has not been made a party, and rejected the petition, observing that the petitioners must come out clean at trial.
The order therefore decides little beyond the threshold question. It does not rule on the SFIO’s jurisdiction over persons connected with Razorpay, on the relationship between Sections 212 and 219, on limitation, on criminal intent, on Section 223(1) of the BNSS or on the applicable KYC standard.
How far does Section 212(14) of the Companies Act reach?
Section 212(1) allows the Central Government to assign an investigation into the affairs of a company to the SFIO. Section 212(14) allows it, after examining the report, to direct prosecution of the company, its officers or employees, or any other person directly or indirectly connected with the affairs of the company. Section 219 separately permits an inspector, with prior Central Government approval, to investigate specified related bodies corporate and individuals.
The question is whether Section 212(14) permits prosecution of a person who was never investigated under Section 212(1) or Section 219. One reading treats the words as wide enough to reach an intermediary through which funds were routed, as the Union argued. The other reads Section 212(14) together with Section 219, so that investigation of a related person requires its own approval, and treats the required connection as a nexus with the company’s affairs rather than mere commercial dealing. The Court did not choose between these readings. The order is not authority for the proposition that every counterparty of an investigated company may be prosecuted.
What does Section 166 require of individual directors?
Section 166(2) requires a director to act in good faith to promote the objects of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole and in the best interests of the company and its stakeholders. Section 166(3) requires due and reasonable care, skill and diligence, and the exercise of independent judgment. Under Section 166(7), a contravention is punishable with a fine of not less than ₹1 lakh and up to ₹5 lakh. The fine is modest; the consequences of a criminal trial are not.
Criminal liability does not attach to a director merely by virtue of office. There must be a statutory provision creating vicarious liability, or material showing an active role with the requisite state of mind: Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 609. Because the complaint frames the case as a direct breach of a duty that Section 166 places on each director, the prosecution will need to show conduct attributable to each director individually, and cannot rest on designation alone. That burden is heavier where the company itself is not an accused. A lapse by an employee or a compliance team is not, without more, a breach by every member of the board. Relevant questions include whether the board approved an adequate onboarding framework, whether responsibility for supervision and escalation was clearly allocated, whether red flags were reported to the board, and whether action followed unusual transaction volumes or patterns.
Which KYC standard applied at the relevant time?
The answer depends on the date of the conduct. The RBI Guidelines on Regulation of Payment Aggregators and Payment Gateways of 17 March 2020 required aggregators, among other things, to maintain a Board-approved merchant onboarding policy, conduct background and antecedent checks, and follow RBI directions on KYC and anti-money laundering. The RBI Master Direction on Regulation of Payment Aggregators of 15 September 2025 supersedes the earlier guidelines and requires customer due diligence of merchants in line with the RBI Master Direction on KYC, with phased timelines for some requirements.
The stricter 2025 framework cannot be applied retrospectively. The trial court will need to identify the obligations in force when MENTPL was onboarded and when its transactions were processed, and how checks were divided between the acquiring bank and the aggregator. The obligations of a regulated lender such as X10 towards its lending service providers under the RBI digital lending framework are distinct; they neither displace nor define the duties of a payment aggregator.
Separately, the Karnataka High Court had quashed Enforcement Directorate proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) against Razorpay, arising from allegations against a different lender said to have run an illegal lending business through mobile applications. The High Court found no prima facie material that Razorpay knew the funds were proceeds of crime or had the intention that Section 3 of the PMLA requires; at most, the material suggested negligence in setting up merchant identifiers. The Supreme Court of India subsequently dismissed the Union’s special leave petition.
The two matters should not be conflated. They involve different lenders and different statutes. Money laundering requires knowledge and intention; Section 166 asks whether directors exercised due care and diligence. Negligence that cannot support a money laundering charge may still be relevant to a charge of failing in diligence, while an onboarding deficiency does not by itself prove a breach of Section 166. To the extent the special leave petition was dismissed without reasons, the dismissal does not declare law under Article 141 of the Constitution: Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359.
In Parvinder Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 INSC 519, decided on 19 May 2026, the Supreme Court held in a PMLA complaint that the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS, which requires the accused to be heard before cognizance is taken on a complaint, is mandatory, and that cognizance taken without that hearing is void. The directors raised Section 223(1) in the alternative. The cognizance order in their case, dated 5 March 2026, preceded Parvinder Singh, and the High Court’s order records the submission without separate discussion. Whether the safeguard applies to an SFIO prosecution remains open: Section 212(15) of the Companies Act treats an SFIO report filed before the Special Court as a police report, while Section 223 is directed to cognizance on a complaint. The character of the SFIO filing may therefore prove decisive in later challenges.
Merchant risk is a board-level matter. An aggregator should be able to show a Board-approved onboarding policy, a clear allocation of responsibility and defined escalation of red flags to the board.
Due diligence does not end at onboarding. Transaction monitoring should test whether a merchant’s activity remains consistent with its declared business, with documented action on anomalies.
Keep a time-stamped compliance record. Records should show which RBI standard applied at each point in time, because the framework has changed materially since 2020.
Assess jurisdiction early. An intermediary that has processed funds for an investigated entity should assess at the outset the reach of Section 212(14) and whether any investigation of related persons was authorised under Section 219.
The Karnataka High Court refused to quash the SFIO complaint against two Razorpay directors, but did not find them liable.
Whether directors discharged their Section 166 duties of care and diligence is a question of fact for trial.
The reach of Section 212(14) over persons outside the investigation order, and its relationship with Section 219, remain undecided.
Director liability must rest on individual conduct, not designation alone (Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI).
The applicable KYC standard is the one in force at the time of onboarding and transactions; the RBI’s 2025 Master Direction cannot be applied retrospectively.
a
On 4 November 2026, in Harshil Mathur v. Union of India, the Court refused to quash the SFIO complaint against two Razorpay directors under Section 166 of the Companies Act, 2013, holding that whether they discharged their duties is a disputed question of fact for trial. It did not decide guilt.
a
No. According to the order, Razorpay is not an accused. Its Whole Time Director and Managing Director are arrayed as Accused Nos. 8 and 9.
a
Under Section 166(7) of the Companies Act, 2013, a director who contravenes Section 166 is punishable with a fine of not less than ₹1 lakh, which may extend to ₹5 lakh.
a
Section 212(14) refers to any other person directly or indirectly connected with the affairs of the company. Whether this extends to an intermediary not investigated under Section 212(1) or Section 219 has not yet been decided; the Karnataka High Court left the question open.
a
The RBI Guidelines of 17 March 2020 required a Board-approved merchant onboarding policy and background checks. The RBI Master Direction on Regulation of Payment Aggregators of 15 September 2025 now requires customer due diligence of merchants in line with the RBI Master Direction on KYC. The standard applicable to any past conduct is the one in force at that time.
a
Yes, for complaints. In Parvinder Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement (2026), the Supreme Court held that the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS is mandatory. Whether it applies to SFIO reports, which are treated as police reports under Section 212(15), is an open question.
Order of the High Court of Karnataka dated 4 November 2026 in Harshil Mathur and Another v. Union of India, W.P. No. 16078 of 2026 (Justice M. Nagaprasanna), copy hosted on livelawbiz.com.
LiveLaw Biz report dated 12 November 2026; Bar & Bench and Inc42 reports on the order.
Parvinder Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 INSC 519 (decided 19 May 2026).
Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 609; Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359; Kaptan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 9 SCC 35.
Companies Act, 2013, Sections 166, 212 and 219; Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, Sections 223 and 528 (indiacode.nic.in).
RBI Guidelines on Regulation of Payment Aggregators and Payment Gateways (17 March 2020); RBI Master Direction on Regulation of Payment Aggregators, RBI/DPSS/2025-26/141 (15 September 2025), rbi.org.in.
Bar & Bench report on the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the Enforcement Directorate’s appeal in the Razorpay PMLA matter.
This article is intended for general information only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers should refer to the official text of the statutes and judgments discussed and seek advice on their specific circumstances.
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