By Anuradha Gandhi , Isha Sharma and Abhishekta Sharma
Introduction
The interface between an employer’s disciplinary powers and the statutory framework under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 also known as the POSH Act has long remained an area of legal uncertainty. While employers undoubtedly possess administrative authority to maintain workplace discipline, the POSH Act creates a specialized mechanism for dealing with allegations of sexual harassment through Internal Committee (ICs).
The question that has repeatedly arisen is whether an employer can create parallel mechanisms to examine complaints before they reach the IC, or whether the statutory process under the POSH Law is exclusive.
The Hon’ble Delhi High Court has now provided an authoritative answer.
In Prof. R S vs University of Delhi & Ors.[1] Hon’ble Mr. Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav delivered an important judgment that simultaneously preserves an employer’s inherent disciplinary powers while reinforcing the exclusivity of the POSH framework.
The Court held that although an employee retains the power to suspend an employee pending a POSH Inquiry, it cannot constitute an extra-statutory fact-finding committee to determine whether allegations amount to sexual harassment.
Equally significant, the Court cautioned that suspension orders must remain neutral and cannot contain language that prejudices allegations or stigmatizes the employee before the statutory inquiry is concluded.
The decision is likely to become a leading precedent on the relationship between service jurisprudence and the POSH Act, particularly for universities, educational institutions, public bodies and large employers that often resort to internal preliminary committees before referring complaints to the IC.
Background
The case arose after three Assistant Professors of Ramanujan College, University of Delhi lodged complaints between March and April 2025 alleging sexual harassment, intimidation and professional misconduct against the College Principal, Prof. R.S.
Instead of immediately referring the complaints to the Internal Committee (IC), the Deputy Registrar (Colleges), University of Delhi constituted an ad hoc fact-finding committee. The Committee conducted meetings, interacted with the parties and submitted a report dated June 23, 2025 concluding that the Principal had created an atmosphere of fear and intimidation. It further observed that the allegations levelled against the Principal are of serious nature and potentially constituted sexual harassment under the POSH Act. Thus, it further recommended that the complaints be referred to the IC of the University.
Acting primarily on this report and after obtaining approval from the Vice-Chancellor, the Chairperson of the College suspended the Principal on September 18, 2025 pending the IC inquiry.
The suspension order, together with the constitution of the ad hoc committee and its report, was challenged before the Delhi High Court.
Issues before the Court
The Division Bench, while disposing of the interim appeals, specifically requested the Single Judge to decide the following questions of law:
- Whether the employer possess the power to suspend an employee during POSH proceedings despite the POSH Act not expressly providing ‘suspension’ as an interim measure?
- Whether a University can constitute a pre-IC and ad hoc fact-finding committee to assess POSH complaints?
- Whether the suspension order in the present case was stigmatic?
These issues formed the heart of the judgment.
Court Findings and Analysis
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Employer’s Power to Suspend
The Petitioner (Principal) for the first issue argued that since the POSH Act is the governing statute for sexual harassment complaints, any action, including suspension, must flow from it, and since Section 12 of the POSH Act, which deals with interim measures during inquiry, does not mention suspension, the College had no power to suspend him.[2]
The Court rejected this argument decisively. Relying extensively on Supreme Court precedent, in R.P. Kapur v. Union of India (1963)[3] and Balvantrai Ratilal Patel v. State of Maharashtra (1967),[4] the Court reiterated the settled principle of service law-
“The power of suspension is an inherent power of the employer, traceable to the master-servant relationship itself, and where service rules and office regulations exist, it must be exercised in consonance with, and circumscribed by, those rules and regulations. The POSH Act neither confers this power afresh, nor does it take it away. The answer to this question lies, in the first instance, in the plain text of the statute itself. Section 28 of the POSH Act, which is the legislature’s own declaration of the relationship between this Act and other laws, categorically provides that the provisions of the Act shall be ‘in addition to’ and ‘not in derogation’ of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.”
According to the Court, the POSH Act supplements existing service rules rather than replacing them. Consequently, disciplinary powers flowing from service rules-including suspension-continue to remain available even during POSH proceedings.
The Court also referred to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India, which held that where the respondent is an employee, the inquiry by the IC must be in accordance with applicable service rules applicable to him and if service rules do not exist, it shall be conducted as may be prescribed, or if he is a domestic worker, the Local Committee must forward the complaint to the police. This reinforced the conclusion that service jurisprudence and the POSH Act operate harmoniously rather than in separate silos.[5]
Importantly, however, the Court clarified that the inherent power to suspend is not absolute. Suspension must be exercised with due application of mind, must conform to the applicable service regulations and remains subject to judicial review.
“The POSH Act nowhere prescribes the power of suspension, nor does it seek to regulate or restrict its exercise. That domain is left entirely to the service rules and the applicable regulations of the institution. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is this ―the power of suspension vests with the employer and is governed by, and circumscribed by, the service rules and office regulations of the institution or organisation concerned. It draws its life from the contract of employment, service rules, and the inherent authority of the employer, not from the POSH Act. It exists independently of the POSH Act. It is exercisable in the context of a POSH inquiry, but it is the service rules, not the POSH Act, that define its scope, limits, and the competent authority to exercise it.”
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Validity of the constitution of Ad-hoc Finding Committee
The Court in the second issue ruled in favor of the petitioner, rejecting the University’s claim that employers have an inherent right to set up preliminary fact‑finding bodies before referring matters to the IC.
Analyzing Section 9 and 11 of the POSH Act, the Court noted that the Parliament has expressly entrusted the responsibility of receiving and inquiring into complaints of sexual harassment to the Internal Committee (IC) or the Local Committee (LC). The repeated use of the word ‘shall’ leaves no room for any parallel or preliminary adjudication mechanism.
Consequently, any committee constituted to determine whether the allegations amount to sexual harassment performs a function exclusively assigned to the IC and therefore operates de hors the statute.
Thus, no parallel or pre‑emptive body can be constituted to duplicate or override their functions. The Court’s reasoning extends beyond statutory interpretation and addresses practical consequences of parallel inquiries.- A pre–IC Committee undermines several core objectives of the POSH Act. First, it compromises confidentiality. The Act specifically protects the identities of complainants, respondents and witnesses under Section 16. Every additional body involved in the process unnecessarily expands access to sensitive information.
- Secondly, the consequence of allowing such a pre-IC fact finding may also have serious consequences on the sanctity of the inquiry. For instance, the victim may be forced to enter into an environment/atmosphere not catered and specialized for handling complaints of such sensitive nature.
- Moreover, such an ad hoc committee could also serve as a means to delay the substantive inquiry under the POSH Act. The complaint of a genuine victim would then hangfire till the ad hoc committee concludes its inquiry.
- Such committees lack any statutory framework governing their composition, procedure, expertise or adherence to the principles of natural justice.
The Court therefore concluded that permitting employers to create such preliminary committees would effectively render the POSH Act redundant.
Principles of Natural Justice
The Court also grounded its reasoning in broader principles of administrative law. Referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Aureliano Fernandes vs State of Goa, it reiterated the twin principles of natural justice- Nemo Judex In Causa Sua (no one should be a judge in their own cause) and Audi Alteram Partem (the right to be heard).[6]
As the ad hoc committee had undertaken a quasi-judicial exercise by evaluating evidence and arriving at conclusions regarding sexual harassment, it was required to satisfy the standards of impartiality and procedural fairness expected of statutory bodies. Since the committee has no statutory basis, no prescribed procedure and no safeguards governing its functioning, the Court held that its constitution violated not only the POSH Act but also foundational principles of natural justice.
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Suspension Order- Stigmatic or not?
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the judgment concerns the drafting of the suspension order.
While the court reaffirmed that an employer has the authority to suspend an employee pending inquiry, it simultaneously emphasized that such an order must remain purely administrative in nature and should not convey any finding of guilt before the conclusion of the statutory process.
Referring to the legal meaning of ‘stigma’, the Court explained that a stigmatic order is one that casts a blemish on an individual’s character, integrity or professional reputation. Applying this principle to the facts of the case, the Court found that the impugned suspension order referred to the allegations as involving ‘serious misconduct and harassment’ and cited the ‘gravity of the matter’. The court held that such language was stigmatic as it could tarnish the employee’s reputation and create an impression of guilt before IC had completed its inquiry.
The Court therefore held the order to be stigmatic and set it aside while granting liberty to the University to issue a fresh suspension order drafted in neutral and legally permissible terms.
Why This Judgment Matters
This case is likely to have practical significance across educational institutions and other workplaces subject to the POSH Act–
- On Ad Hoc Committees: Universities, colleges, and other employers sometimes constitute committees or panels to “assess” complaints before deciding whether to escalate them to the IC. This judgment squarely prohibits that practice in the context of sexual harassment complaints. Complaints received under the POSH Act must go to the IC, there is no lawful room for a pre-IC filter.
- On Suspension: The judgment provides useful clarity that suspension during a POSH inquiry is permissible, it is an employer’s prerogative derived from Service Rules and the employment relationship, not from the POSH Act itself. This should resolve confusion in workplaces where HR teams have been uncertain whether any action can be taken against a respondent before the ICC concludes its inquiry.
- On drafting Suspension orders: The Court’s analysis of stigmatic language is a useful reminder to HR practitioners and legal departments. The impulse to justify a suspension by cataloguing the seriousness of allegations is understandable but legally impermissible. A suspension order must be strictly neutral, procedural, and non-committal on the merits.
- On the POSH Act as a protective statute: The Court treats the POSH Act as social welfare legislation designed to protect complainants, not merely to govern respondents. The IC is a specialized body with expertise in handling sensitive matters; routing complaints through it promptly and without diversion is itself a form of protection for victims. Courts reading this judgment will see that circumventing the IC, even in the name of preliminary inquiry, will not pass muster.
[1] https://indiankanoon.org/doc/39528336/
[3] https://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/1388803/?big=0&formInput=suspension%20order
[4] https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1447295/
[5] https://ssrana.in/articles/validity-interdepartmental-inquiry-posh-act/
[6] https://ssrana.in/posh-law/articles/intersection-of-natural-justice-and-posh-law/