By Anuradha Gandhi and Rachita Thakur
Introduction
In a usual turn of events, the Supreme Court recently in a case of sexual harassment, V.P. v. N. K.C. & Ors,[1] (Abbreviations used for maintaining confidentiality) pronounced an unusual punishment for the Vice-chancellor (hereinafter referred to as the “Respondent”) of a renowned University. While dismissing the appeal, the bench comprising of Hon’ble Justices Mr. Pankaj Mithal and Mr. Prasanna B. Varale, ordered the judgement recording be made part of the resume of the Respondent.
What led to the filing of the present appeal?
Filing of the complaint of sexual harassment
The Appellant, a faculty member of the University, filed a complaint of sexual harassment against the Respondent with the Local Committee (hereinafter referred to as the “LC”) on December 26, 2023. The LC rejected the complaint as time-barred since the last incident of sexual harassment had occurred in April 2023 while the complaint was submitted in December 2023 which was not only beyond the prescribed term of three months but also beyond the extendable period of limitation of six months.
Appeal before the Single Judge Bench of the High Court
Aggrieved by the rejection of the LC, the Appellant preferred a writ petition before the High Court wherein the Single Judge of the High Court vide order dated May 22, 2024, quashed the order of the LC and directed that the complaint be reheard on merits.
The Single Judge noted that the Appellant was subjected to threat of detrimental treatment in her employment after April 2023 wherein the Respondent created an intimidating, offensive and hostile work environment for her and therefore, the complaint was well within the limitation period, thereby taking the subsequent events as the last date of incident of sexual harassment.
Decision of the Division Bench of the High Court
The decision of the single judge was taken up by the Division Bench of the High Court in a Writ Appeal,[2] wherein the division Bench held that the administrative actions taken against the Appellant after April 2023 were collective decision of the Executive Council consisting of eminent academicians, jurists, and even Supreme Court Judges and were not personal actions of the Respondent. The Court overruled the probability of the involvement of the Respondent in the case of misconduct which was handled by the Executive Council separately.
Hence, holding that the events after April 2023 did not constitute sexual harassment and in fact even the Appellant in her communications to the chancellor and the Executive Council did not make any allegations of sexual harassment against the Respondent and therefore, the complaint filed in December 2023 was held to be beyond the limitation period of six months and hence time barred.
Question before the Supreme Court
The key question before the Supreme court in the present appeal was – “Whether the Division Bench of the High Court is justified in non-suiting the appellant on the ground that her complaint was barred by limitation.”
While considering the bare provisions of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, (hereinafter referred to as the “POSH Act”) the court made the following observations:
- The Court noted the provisions of the POSH Act under Section 2 (n) for definition of sexual harassment; Section 3 enlisting circumstances that imply sexual harassment; section 9 that postulates way the complaint has to be made and prescribes a time period for submitting the complaint.
- The Court noted that the issue of limitation is ordinarily a mix of question of fact and law, and it is not possible to reject a complaint without collecting material aspects relating to limitation.
- While considering the facts of the complaint, the Court noted that the incidents of sexual harassment alleged by the Appellant between period 2019 to April 2023. In addition to the same the court also noted the Disciplinary proceedings initiated against the Appellant on August 2025 wherein she was removed from the position of Director, Centre of Financial, Regulatory and Governance Studies post which a preliminary inquiry was instituted against her by the Executive Council.
- The Court iterated that the last date of incident happened in April 2023 and the decision of removing her was taken completely independently based on a complaint received from the Central Government wherein the Appellant was specifically named which had not direct connection with the previous incidents of sexual harassment.
- The decision of the Executive Council was a collective decision and not a unilateral action by the Respondent hence the said act would not amount to sexual harassment in conjunction with the previous acts.
- Furthermore, the actions taken against the Appellant in the disciplinary proceedings do not amount to creating hostile environment either since there was no “direct link between the acts complained or an overt act of sexual harassment.”
- The Appellant has also not made any allegations of sexual harassment after April 2023 and in fact filed the complaint of sexual harassment immediately after the Executive Council concluded the inquiry on December 21, 2023. The Appellant has also moved an application for condonation of delay which demonstrates that Appellant was well-aware about the delay stating that there were “mitigating circumstances and was conscious of the delay where she herself treated April 2023 as the last date of incident.
Decision of the Supreme Court
- The Court dismissed the appeal by upholding the decision of the Division Bench while recording that there was no error in restoring the decision of the LC that the complaint was time barred.
- However, the court also held that it is advisable to forgive the wrongdoer, but not to forget the wrongdoing. The wrong which has been committed against the appellant may not be investigated on technical grounds, but it must not be forgotten. The court ordered that the judgment shall be made part of the Respondent resume, the compliance of which is strictly ensured by him personally.
[1] Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 17936 of 2025
[2] FMA No. 873 of 2024 (M.A.T. No. 1295 of 2024)