By Anuradha Gandhi, Isha Sharma and Abhishekta Sharma
Introduction
In a significant ruling with wide implications for workplace harassment law, the Gujarat High Court declined to quash the final inquiry report of an Internal Complaint Committee (ICC) constituted under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, commonly known as the POSH Act. [1]
While affirming the integrity and legality of the ICC’s findings, the Court said that forums deciding POSH complaints must be careful not to develop a “reverse bias” against the accused.
Background of the Case
The employee, an Assistant Manager in a cooperative milk federation, has lodged a POSH complaint against the Managing Director and another official, alleging misbehavior, inappropriate physical contact and verbal misconduct. The organization’s ICC conducted a detailed inquiry under Section 11 of the POSH Act[2], examined CCTV footage, witness statements and relevant evidence and ultimately concluded that the allegations were false and baseless. The petitioner then approached the Gujarat High Court seeking to quash the ICC report and direct a fresh inquiry by an independent committee.[3]
ICC’s key findings
The ICC’s report categorically dismissed the complainant’s allegations of inappropriate physical contact, verbal misconduct and misbehavior as false and misleading after a comprehensive Section 11 inquiry. Analysizing CCTV footage, it found no corroboration of claimed physical proximity or advances by accused. Witness statements from colleagues contradicted her version revealing inconsistencies in timelines and events, while police records showed no independent substantiation. The committee applied the definition under Section 2(n) of POSH Act but concluded the interactions were professional disagreements, not sexual sexual harassment, recommending no action against the accused while advising the complainant for counselling on the workplace conduct.
High Court upholds ICC findings
The Gujarat High Court declined to interfere with the ICC report, holding that it was conducted in strict compliance with the statutory framework and that there was no apparent illegality, bias or procedural flaw. The bench consisting of Honourable Mr. Justice Hemant M. Prachchhak emphasized that the ICC had fully followed the inquiry procedure, considered the material on record and recorded findings in a reasoned manner. The Court found the ICC’s Section 11 inquiry thorough and impartial, as it meticulously reviewed the CCTV footage, witness testimonies, police records and all submitted evidence before concluding the allegations of sexual harassment were baseless and misleading, with no evidence of selective reliance or overlooked materials. The court reiterated that the ordinary remedy for the complainant was to appeal the ICC’s decision before the Appellate Authority under Section 18 of the POSH Act[4], rather than filling a writ petition, particularly where the employer-organization was not a “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution.
Reverse Bias in POSH Cases
While reaffirming the importance of protecting women from workplace harassment, the High Court cautioned adjudicating forums against developing a “reverse bias” against male accused in such matters. Observing that POSH Act itself provides adequate safeguards and a fair procedure, the bench noted that layering additional protection on the complainant could become counterproductive. This is what the court called “reverse bias”. It is not a bias born of bad intent. It often comes from a genuine desire to protect. But good intentions do not make an unfair process fair.
The court warned that excessive or disproportionate abuse of the provisions of the statute which might inadvertently create a “glass ceiling” for genuine, competent employees and could deter employers from hiring or promoting women or allow mixed gender teams.
When can a fresh inquiry be ordered in a POSH Matter?
The POSH Act does not expressly provide for a “fresh inquiry”. The ICs report under Section 13 is final. However, courts and the Section 18 Appellate Authority have ordered fresh inquiries in limited, well defined circumstances:
- Defective IC Composition- an IC not constituted in accordance with Section 4, particularly the absence of the mandatory external member, renders the entire inquiry void.[5]
- Reports arising from oral complaints or against persons over whom the IC has no authority can be set aside.[6]
- The Appellate Authority has inherent power to remand for fresh inquiry where it finds the prior inquiry materially defective as also said in the present case that Section 18 as an efficacious remedy.
What POSH Act actually covers?
The judgment also highlighted that definition of sexual harassment under the Section 2(n) of the POSH Act is broad, covering both direct and implied forms of unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct but stressed that burden remains on the complainant to prove allegations on a preponderance of probabilities. The court reiterated that mere filing of a complaint does not automatically infer guilt and that the accused must be afforded a fair opportunity.
Conclusion
The Gujarat High Court’s ruling in this case is neither anti-woman nor insensitive to the realities of workplace sexual harassment. It is, at its core, a statement about the indispensability of fairness in any legal process. The bench’s observation that the POSH Act already contains sufficient safeguards is a reassurance- not a restriction. It means that courts and committees need not go beyond the law to protect complainants the law already does the job.
What they must not do, the court emphasizes, is let the protective intent of the law color their judgment to the point where male accused is presumed guilty or where complaint is treated as established fact before evidence is weighed. That is not justice, it is the mirror image of the very discrimination the POSH Act was designed to eradicate.
[1] R/Special Civil Application No. 3285 of 2026, Petitioner vs Respondent
[2] Inquiry into complaint, § 11 of POSH Act, 2013
[3] https://24law-prod.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/pdf/1776913544_8698-gujarat-hc-re-respondents.pdf
[4] Appeal.—(1) Any person aggrieved from the recommendations made under sub-section (2) of section 13 or under clause (i) or clause (ii) of sub-section (3) of section 13 or sub-section (1) or subsection (2) of section 14 or section 17 or non-implementation of such recommendations may prefer an appeal to the court or tribunal in accordance with the provisions of the service rules applicable to the said person or where no such service rules exist then, without prejudice to provisions contained in any other law for the time being in force, the person aggrieved may prefer an appeal in such manner as may be prescribed. (2) The appeal under sub-section (1) shall be preferred within a period of ninety days of the recommendations.
[5] Ruchika Singh Chhabra v. M/s. Air France India and Anr (2018)
[6] Aurelino Fernandes vs State of Goa (2023)