By Anuradha Gandhi, Isha Sharma and Rishabh Gupta
Introduction
In a significant judgement reinforcing the protection of women and minors, the Hon’ble Supreme Court addressed the grave issue of sexual assault against a minor girl and held that quashing of a First Information Report (hereinafter referred to as “FIR”) in cases of sexual assault solely on the basis of a compromise effectuated between the parties is invalid and warrants judicial interference.
Background of the Case
In the present case[1] the Accused, a school teacher, sexually assaulted the Victim, a minor girl of Class XI of the same school by patting her cheeks and putting his hands inside her body. He even made remarks such as ‘Dedh Chamar’ when the victim was running away from him. The other teachers including the principal of the school were of no help. An FIR was filed by the father of the victim girl on January 08, 2022 against the Accused under sections 354A[2], 342[3], 509[4] and 504[5] of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 7 and 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as “POCSO Act”) which penalizes sexual assault.
Considering the fact that a compromise was made between the father of the Victim girl (Respondent No. 4) and the Accused (Respondent No. 3), the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur, on an application filed under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “CrPC”) by both the parties, quashed the FIR and all further proceedings.
The High Court relied upon the judgement of Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab[6], which states that, the offences which are of private nature and does not affect the public peace and a compromise between the parties would bring peace and justice, the High Court in such cases may quash the proceedings by exercising the inherent powers vested in it under section 482 of CrPC.
Appeal to Supreme Court
The order of the High Court was challenged by the residents (third-parties) from the same Tehsil as the Victim’s father, through an appeal initially filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, which was later converted into a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 on the grounds that:
- The alleged act was not of purely private nature;
- The offences were against the rules of society having a serious impact; and
- The decision was solely based on a compromise and was not challenged by the Public Prosecutor
Issues before the Court
The Supreme Court dealt with the following two issues:
- Whether a third-party to a criminal proceeding has a locus standi to challenge the order passed by the High Court, in a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution?
- Whether serious, grave and heinous offences which involves a moral turpitude and are against the society such as the one in the present case (Sexual Assault) could be set aside based on a compromise made between the parties?
Arguments of the Respondents
- Respondent No. 3 was of the view that it is impermissible for a third-party to interfere in criminal proceedings. The respondent relied on various decisions which simultaneously ruled that “unnecessary interference in the criminal case by a stranger may cause, sometimes, damage to the prosecution case and at times may cause serious prejudice to the accused also and therefore would only deny a fair trial to the accused”[7]and“ a total stranger cannot be permitted to question the correctness of the conviction recorded against the convicts as If that were permitted any and every person could challenge convictions recorded day in and day out by courts even if the persons convicted do not desire to do so and are inclined to acquiesce in the decision[8]”
- Respondent No. 4 was of the view that as no fundamental rights of the Appellants were infringed, therefore they could not maintain a petition under Article 32. Furthermore, since the petition was converted into a Special Leave Petition, the Appellants would also not have any locus standi.to challenge the order of the High Court.
Judicial Observation
The Supreme Court ruled that the quashing of proceedings initiated under the POCSO Act by the High Court is against the intention of the legislature behind its enactment which strives to protect children of tender age and their childhood or youth from getting exploited or abused. The Court while citing Mohan Lal vs. Ajit Singh[9] further opined that the right to a third party to prefer a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution is certainly to be recognized and respected in a case where a seemingly miscarriage of justice had occurred and still, neither the State nor the victim or any relative falling under the term ‘victim’ approached this Court.
Additionally, the court while citing Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab[10] set aside the order of the High Court and ruled that the power under Section 482 CrPC cannot be used to quash proceedings based on compromise if it is in respect of heinous offence which are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. The matter in the present case, cannot be regarded as a matter of private nature as the act has been done by a school teacher and has a serious impact on the society. Therefore, the court ordered the FIR, investigation and criminal proceedings to be proceeded against the accused.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s ruling reinforces that a criminal act adversely impacts the public at large and poses a threat to societal peace and therefore, a person accused of such grave crimes cannot be absolved merely because compensation has been paid or an amicable settlement has been reached. On the same lines, the concept of Conciliation as provided under section 10 of Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 can only be exercised when explicitly requested by the aggrieved woman and at the same time also forbids any kind of monetary settlement.
However, an exception has been added by the Supreme Court to the above provisions, in its recent judgement, Madhukar & Ors. vs. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.[11]Dated July 14, 2025 where it held that criminal proceedings related to rape offences can be quashed based on settlement between the parties in exceptional circumstances. The court noted that although the offences under Section 376 of Indian Penal Code are grave and heinous and a settlement should not be permitted, however, the inherent power of courts to secure justice must be applied with reference to the facts of the each case. The court opined that, as the Complainant in this case was married and settled in her personal life and had maintained her stand not to continue with the prosecution, therefore the criminal proceedings would not serve any useful purpose and would only amount to abuse of process.
Therefore, it becomes important that the High Court before exercising its inherent powers must give due regard to the facts of the case and inter alia follow the process as laid down in State of MP vs. Laxmi Narayan[12] to quash the proceedings which includes:
- Whether the crime is against the society
- Seriousness of the crime
- Whether the offence is under a special statute
- Stage of proceedings and the manner of making compromise
[1] Ramji Lal Bairwa vs. The State Of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3193
[2] Section 354A IPC, A man committing, “physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures”, shall be guilty of the offence of sexual harassment and shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
[3] Section 342 IPC, Whoever wrongfully confines any person shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
[4] Section 509, Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any woman, utters any words, makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object, intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture or object shall be seen, by such woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman, [shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and also with fine].
[5] Section 504 IPC, Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
[6] (2012) 10 SCC 303
[7] Rajiv Ranjan Singh ‘Lalan’ vs. Union Of India, (2006) 6 SCC 613
[8] Simranjit Singh Mann vs Union Of India, (1992) 4 SCC 653
[9] (1978) 3 SCC 279
[10] (2012) 10 SCC 303
[11] SLP (Crl.) No. 7212 of 2025
[12] (2019) 5 SCC 688