Key Arbitration Judgments of 2025
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Un-Dispute!
Vikrant Rana
Managing Partner
This yearly edition offers a carefully curated, month-wise compilation of landmark arbitration judgments delivered throughout 2025, capturing the evolving judicial approach and key legal developments shaping the arbitration and dispute resolution landscape. Each judgment highlighted reflects significant shifts in legal interpretation, procedural clarity, and substantive principles governing arbitration.
Beyond analysis, this edition emphasizes practical application. The precedents discussed herein are regularly relied upon and applied in resolving real-time arbitration and complex dispute matters, ensuring that judicial guidance is seamlessly translated into effective legal strategy and outcome-oriented solutions for our clients. Through this approach, the newsletter bridges jurisprudence with practice and reaffirms our commitment to informed, precedent-driven dispute resolution.
Nihit Nagpal
Partner Dispute Resolution
JANUARY, 2025
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KRISHNA DEVI V. UNION OF INDIA
[2025 SCC OnLine SC 24]- SUPREME COURT
In this ruling, the Hon’ble Supreme Court interpreted the statutory phrase “notify the parties” that an award has been filed, as mandated under Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and Sections 14 and 17 of the A&C Act. It held that the term “notify” does not require a special form of notice, but simply means that the parties are aware about the existence of the award and are in a position to plan their next steps accordingly, including informal expressions. Unlike some other legal procedures, the law here does not require a party to actually receive a physical copy of the award in their hands to start the limitation timeline. It was further clarified that as per section 14(2), the date of receiving a copy of the award is not a requirement, but mere awareness that it is available to the parties is sufficient and parties must act in their best effort to scrutinise the award themselves as soon as it becomes accessible and they are aware of its accessibility.
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M/S. ISC PROJECTS V. STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA
[2025 SCC OnLine Del 1133] – DELHI HIGH COURT
The Delhi High Court, herein, dealt with a critical procedural rule: who must sign a final arbitration award? The Hon’ble bench held that signing an award is a “substantive” requirement, and not just a minor procedural formality, which demonstrates that every member of the panel was involved in the final decision. Under the law, if an arbitrator cannot or will not sign, the award must explicitly state the reason for the missing signatures. In the case at hand, since both- the signature as well as an explanation, was missing, the award was rendered as invalid.
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DISORTHO S.A.S. V. MERIL LIFE SCIENCES (P) LTD.
[2025 SCC OnLine SC 570]- SUPREME COURT
The Hon’ble Apex Court by distinguishing between lex contractus, lex arbitri and lex fori, held that where an agreement specifying Indian Laws prescribes a foreign arbitral institution as the seat and venue, the Indian Courts shall not exercise any referral powers and jurisdiction under section 11(6) of the Act. It laid down a “three stage test” (as in the judgment of Sulamérica Cia Nacional de Seguros S.A. vs. Enesa Engenharia S.A., [2012] EWCA Civ 638) to ascertain the law that shall govern an arbitration agreement, viz., (i) identification of the expressed choice of the parties, (ii) in an absence of the expressed choice, implied choice, and (iii) the closest and the most real connection. It was further held that Part I of the Act shall only apply where the arbitration was either seated in India or where the governing laws of the agreement were Indian laws.
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GAYATRI BALASAMY V. ISG NOVASOFT TECHNOLOGIES LTD.
[(2025) 7 SCC 1] – SUPREME COURT
The Hon’ble Apex Court addressed the issue relating to the extent of the powers of the Indian Courts to modify an arbitral award under section 34 and 37 of the A&C Act. It was stated that, since severing the invalid portion of an award from the valid portion was an inherent power of the court under section 34, it also allowed for severance of non-arbitrable portions of an award from the arbitrable ones by following the prerequisites laid.
The Court further enabled jurisdictional courts with limited powers of modification, not being merit-based evaluation. This power could be exercised in certain circumstances, viz., (i) by severing the invalid portion from the award, (ii) by correcting errors that appear erroneous on the face of record, (iii) by modifying the post award interest in some cases, and (iv) by exercising great care and caution in exercising powers under Article 142.
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ARABIAN EXPORTS (P) LTD. V. NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.
[2025 SCC OnLine SC 1034] – SUPREME COURT
The Hon’ble Apex Court held that giving a full and final discharge voucher to the insurer or accepting the offered amount in times of economic distress cannot automatically be a bar to reference to an arbitration. The reasoning offered was that a dispute relating to the full and final settlement itself amounts to a dispute arising out of or in relation to a substantive contract, and thus cannot be precluded from reference to arbitration. It is because the arbitration clause/agreement continues to be in existence even after the parties discharge the original contract by ‘accord and satisfaction’.
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MANGAYARKARASI & ANR. V. N.J. SUNDARESAN & ANR.
[(2025) 8 SCC 299] – SUPREME COURT
The Hon’ble Apex Court determined the arbitrability of trademark disputes by distinguishing between those impacting the public at large and those that are private in nature involving only the involved parties, such as contractual use of trademark. It held that the latter type of matters were arbitrable.
The Court viewed allegations of fraud or criminal charges as ousting the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction, but classified trademark disputes from civil or contractual relationship as falling squarely within arbitrable matters. It further upheld the protected status of arbitration agreements, ruling that courts bear a positive obligation under section 8 of the Act to refer parties to arbitration by enforcing the terms of the contract.
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BGM AND M-RPL-JMCT (JV) V. EASTERN COALFIELDS LIMITED
[2025 SCC OnLine SC 1471] – SUPREME COURT
The Hon’ble Apex Court ruled that deciding the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement falls to the arbitral tribunal. The referral court needs only a prima facie evidence of the agreement’s existence, shown through a straightforward reading of the clause. It should not hold a mini trial to enquire its existence.
The Court further held that language like “may be sought” in the arbitration agreement intends that additional consent is required before a reference to arbitration is made. Such provisions do not form valid arbitration clauses and they serve merely as enabling clauses.
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GLENCORE INTERNATIONAL AG V. M/S. SHREE GANESH METALS & ANR.
[2025 SCC OnLine SC 1815] – SUPREME COURT
The Hon’ble Apex Court answered the dilemma about the existence of an arbitration clause binding the parties prior to the signing of a valid contract between them, in affirmative. It held that there was no formal requirement of a contract to be signed under section 7, as also established in various precedents, and the existence of an arbitration agreement could be inferred by way of the exchange of letters, communication through online means, acknowledgement of the contractual obligations, and other actions of the parties which clearly demonstrate acceptance of the said contract in question. A mere failure to affix signature on the contract by a party does not let it escape its obligations as laid therein.
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CHAKARDHARI SUREKA V. PREM LATA SUREKA
[SLP (C) No. 20480 of 2025] – SUPREME COURT
The Hon’ble Apex Court negated the contention that since an appeal under section 37 of the A&C Act is pending, the proceedings qua execution of the award should be deferred. It was held that a pending appeal does not render an automatic stay on the proceedings and it would not be just to adjourn the proceedings on this ground. However, an interim order operating against the award shall halt the proceedings, and the execution court shall examine objections to the executability as and when they are raised, and the same shall be addresses as per the statute and the principles of natural justice.
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LANCOR HOLDINGS LTD. V. PREM KUMAR MENON
[2025 INSC 1277] – SUPREME COURT
The question that posed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was whether an inordinate delay in the pronouncement of the award hamper its validity. The bench examined opinions suggesting unexplained delay amounting to injustice and violation of public policy, while the provision under section 34 of the act did not postulate delay as a ground to set aside, and ultimately held that a balance between the pace of the arbitration, culmination of award and satisfactory content need to be struck in order to uphold the absolute faith and trust in the system. A straitjacket formula cannot be sketched, and the same can be decided on case to case basis. In the present matter, the four year long delay was found to be unexplained and a failure to provide a resolution exhibiting a lapse in diligence, and therefore the award was found to be invalid and set aside.
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HINDUSTAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY V. BIHAR RAJYA PUL NIRMAAN NIGAM
[2025 INSC 1365] – SUPREME COURT
The Hon’ble Apex Court held that once the parties actively participates or consents to the continuation of the proceedings, they are deemed to have relinquished their right to challenge the process under section 12 and 4. The court analysed the legislative intent of the statute and deduced that it discouraged tactical objections and multiplicity of proceedings. In the present case, the respondent’s extensive participation, filing of pleadings, attending hearings and seeking extensions under section 29A created an absolute bar against questioning the arbitrator’s appointment or validity of the arbitration clause.
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HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD. V. BCL SECURE PREMISES PVT. LTD.
[2025 SCC OnLine SCC 2746] – SUPREME COURT
The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the arbitral tribunal also has the jurisdiction to examine whether a non-signatory party comes under the ambit of a “veritable party” based on factual evidence and applications of legal doctrines laid in various precedents viz., cox and kings, etc., even after the referral court has decided upon the same. It was explained that the referral court’s order making a non-signatory as a veritable party will not foreclose the Arbitral Tribunal’s power to provide a contrary view after an extensive inquiry.