By Nihit Nagpal and Avik Gopal
Indian Courts apply a well-established threefold test when considering the grant of interim injunctions in civil suits. Firstly, the Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case, demonstrating that there is a genuine and substantial issue to be tried. Secondly, the balance of convenience must favor the Plaintiff, meaning the hardship caused to the Plaintiff if the injunction is denied would outweigh the hardship to the Defendant if it is granted. Thirdly, the Plaintiff must show that irreparable injury would result if the injunction is not granted, as such harm cannot be adequately compensated by damages. The burden of proof lies on the Plaintiff to satisfy these conditions, and Courts decide each case based on its specific facts while being guided by these principles.
While the threefold test for granting interim injunctions remains applicable in defamation suits also, the standards are slightly more complex as interim injunctions in defamation suit at the intersection of two fundamental rights, the right to reputation and right to free speech and expression.
With advancement of technology, communication through the internet is prompt and has a wider impact on the public. With the wide ambit of social media usage and extent of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 of the Constitution of India, Courts need to be more practical than ever in granting interim injunctions in cases of alleged defamation balancing both the protection of freedom of speech and reputation of the aggrieved party. Depending on the nature of rights and remedies, Courts improvise to balance out these conflicting rights while deciding interim injunctions in defamation suits. This article seeks to analyze the standards for grant of interim injunction in defamation cases.
Criteria for Grant of Interim Injunction in Defamation Cases
For grant of interim injunctions in defamation cases, Indian Courts have placed reliance on the Bonnard Principle, established by the landmark case of Bonnard v. Perryman[1] decided in Court of Appeal of England and Whales in 1891.
The Court clarified that, at the interlocutory stage, it is not appropriate to conduct a mini trial on the truth or justification of the alleged defamatory statement. Instead, an injunction should only be granted in clear and exceptional cases where the Court is satisfied that the Defendant has no viable defense at trial and the Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if publication continues. If the Defendant raises the defense of justification of truth a recognized defense in defamation the Court should refrain from granting an injunction unless it is evident that the defense is bound to fail. Furthermore, the alleged defamatory statement must be ex facie defamatory, not merely prima facie.
To understand defamation, the following essential elements must be present:
- The Statement must be Defamatory.
- It must refer to the Plaintiff.
- It must be Published.
- The Publication must be made to a third party.
There is no liability if the Defendant did not intend the statement to be seen by anyone other than the Plaintiff. Additionally, the statement must be understood by others, and the publication should result in actual or presumed damage. For criminal defamation, malicious intent is a necessary prerequisite.
The valid defences available to a Defendant include:
- Justification of truth
- Fair comment on matters of public interest
- Privilege
Courts generally rely on these principles when deciding whether to grant interim injunctions in defamation suits. However, with the rise of internet-based defamation, Courts now assess each case on its specific facts, carefully analysing the circumstances before granting or refusing injunctions.[2]
Evolving Judicial Views in Granting Interim Injunction in Defamation Cases
To measure the extent of the framework adopted by the Indian Courts in granting interim injunctions in defamation cases, it is essential to examine the case of Gaurav Bhatia v. Naveeen Kumar[3]. The Plaintiff, a Senior Advocate moved against multiple X (formerly Twitter) users and YouTube channels for circulating allegedly defamatory posts and deepfake videos showing him being assaulted during a lawyer’s strike. The Court granted an ad-interim injunction directing removal of some posts and videos and ordered some videos to be made private, not open to public for viewing. The Court treated the risk of irreparable harm and prima facie falsity of material as sufficient to justify interim injunction while preserving parties right to trial.
This order reflects judicial sensitivity that Courts are willing to depart from a rigid interpretation of the Bonnard principle when the content is demonstrably false, like deepfake videos in this case, and where online circulation of the alleged defamatory publication makes reputation loss both swift and difficult to repair.
In another case of Dr. Vikram Sampath v. Audrey Truschke & Ors.[4], a series of interlocutory orders were passed in the defamation suit filed by the historian Vikram Sampath against several academicians who had called out plagiarism in his work. In February 2022, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court passed an ad interim order restraining the Defendants from publishing allegedly defamatory material. However, it soon after refused to continue or expand its interim relief, observing that academic debate and criticism are matters of public interest and judicial restraint is needed not to suppress scholarly discussion. The Court’s later reluctance to extend interim measures underscores that academic or scholarly criticism enjoys free speech protection and Courts will grant interim relief only in clear cut cases of malicious false publication where reputational damage cannot be remedied later.
The landmark case of Tata Sons Ltd. V. Greenpeace Int.[5], involved a video game and campaign materials created by Greenpeace International that Tata Ltd. claimed contained defamatory statements that damaged its corporate reputation. The online game indicated TATA’s involvement in an industrial project, which allegedly had a fatal effect on the nesting and breeding of “Olive Ridley Turtles”. While deciding whether or not to grant injunction, the Hon’ble High Court placed reliance on the Bonnard Principle and interpreted it as a principle in which subject-matter of an action for defamation is so special as to require exceptional caution in exercising the jurisdiction to interfere by injunction before the trial of an action to prevent an anticipated wrong. The Plaintiff argued that the game being available online, a higher ownership should be considered as an additional factor while examining the criteria of balance of convenience and irreparable injury.[6]
Considering the facts of the case, the Hon’ble High Court observed that the threefold test would still apply to online publications, despite its uncanny character. The Court observed that even if the content is ex-facie defamatory, the Defendant has pleaded/ offered justification for the truth of the alleged defamatory content, then the Courts should not readily grant interim injunction to restraint the content. It was further observed by Hon’ble Delhi High Court that despite the characteristic of wide viewership and degree of permanence in cases of internet publication, such publication still remained a medium of expression and thus required no additional or different standard for grant of interim injunction. The Hon’ble Court, ultimately, took a view that it would not be prudent to restrain freedom of expression by directing an interim injunction that curbs the publication of the alleged defamatory content or awards damages, without a full trial in which the parties can rely on additional evidence. The Court emphasized that the need to leave room for public interest advocacy and criticism and also noted that the Plaintiff has alternative remedies and that such speculative reputational loss did not, on the facts of it, justify restraint.[7]
In the case of Lodha Developers Ltd. v. Krishnaraj Rao[8], the Plaintiff has sued a journalist for various allegedly defamatory publications regarding construction quality of the Plaintiff’s construction sites. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court refused a broad interim restraint, stating that there was a Defendant’s plea of documentary evidence of the same alleged defamatory publication and the public interest in investigative reporting. This judgement stresses that every adverse report does not call for an interlocutory suppression order and the Courts must keep the public’s right to receive information and that of the journalist to justify his reporting. Bonnard principle’s caution about pre-trial determination of truth is evident here.
In the case of Smriti Zubin Irani v. Pawan Khera[9], Union Minister Smriti Zubani Irani against several Congress leaders and other for allegedly false public statements about her and her family’s ownership of a restaurant and its license. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court had granted an interim injunction in 2022 restraining publication and issuing takedowns. In 2024, the Court modified the earlier order, particularly as it related to the obligations on social media platforms and scope of the takedown, reflecting caution about restraints on political speech. The modification made by the Court thus recognized both the reputational interest of the Plaintiff and the free speech considerations when political actors are involved and also demonstrated a judicial attempt at calibrating relief so as not to impose disproportionate burdens on intermediaries or impose restrictions on public debate.
Conclusion
The Bonnard principle remains the role model guiding the interlocutory relief in defamation suits. Indian Courts have shown adaptive creativity in its application, and their jurisprudence reflects a textured balancing, protecting reputation where harm is demonstrable and immediate, while robustly safeguarding free expression in political discourse, public interest advocacy, journalism and academic debate. With the changing circumstances, especially the rapid and widespread reach of social media, the Courts have endeavored to read into the established standards for grant of interim injunction because of the wider reach of social media and the consequent impact on public at large. The Courts nowadays apply the Bonnard principle in a contextualized, technologically aware and application-based manner that preserved the rule of law and the marketplace of ideas that preserve the rule of law.
Reedhav Gulati, Intern at S.S.Rana & Co. has assisted in the research of this article.
[1] Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch. 269.
[2] Kushagra, “Grant Of Interim Injunction In Defamation Suits ” Mondaq, S&A Law Offices, 23 Jan 2025, https://www.mondaq.com/india/libel-defamation/1573104/grant-of-interim injunction-in-defamation-suits#authors
[3] Gaurav Bhatia v. Naveeen Kumar, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 2704.
[4] Ongoing Case, Delhi High Court – CS (OS) 95/2022
[5] Tata Sons Limited v. Greenpeace International, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 466.
[6] Vikesh, Nikhil.” Jurisprudence around Grant of Interim Injunction in Defamation Suits in India” Cyril Amarchand blogs, 28 Deb 2024, https://disputeresolution.cyrilamarchandblogs.com/2024/02/jurisprudence-around-grant-of-interim-injunction-in-defamation-suits-in-india/
[7] Vikash Jha, “Jurisprudence Around Grant Of Interim Injunction In Defamation Suits In India.” Conventus Law, 5 March 2024,
[8] Lodha Developers Ltd. v. Krishnaraj Rao, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 13120.
[9] Smriti Zubin Irani v. Pawan Khera, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 2310.