By Shuchita Chaubey and Nihit Nagpal
When two parties agree to arbitrate, they are striking a quiet bargain. They agree to keep their dispute out of the ordinary court system and place it before a tribunal of their own choosing, in return for something they value: speed, neutrality, and above all, finality. The deal is simple: once the arbitrator decides, the matter is meant to be more or less closed. Courts are supposed to stand back, not wade in.
Real disputes, of course, rarely end so politely. The losing side almost always feels the award got something wrong, and the natural reflex is to ask a court to fix it. That brings us to one of the most important and most misunderstood questions in Indian arbitration law: when a party challenges an arbitral award in court, how much can the court actually do? Can it reopen the evidence? Can it disagree with the arbitrator’s reading of the contract? Can it rewrite the award, or only cancel it? And after the Supreme Court’s recent Constitution Bench decision in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd., can a court now trim parts of an award instead of striking the whole thing down?
These are not academic riddles. They decide whether the time and money poured into arbitration buys genuine closure or merely opens the door to years of further litigation. As the Supreme Court put it bluntly in MP Road Development Corporation v. Jabalpur Corridor (2026), “arbitration in India has not failed, however Courts sometimes have failed arbitration in India.” This article walks through what Section 34 really means, the stance courts took before Gayatri Balasamy, what that judgment changed, and where the law stands today.
What Section 34 Actually Means
Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 is the doorway through which a dissatisfied party can ask a court to set aside an award. The first thing to grasp is how deliberately narrow that doorway is.
The statute does not invite the court to rehear the dispute. It opens with the word “only”: recourse against an award “may be made only by an application for setting aside such award.” As the Supreme Court explained in V.K. John v. S. Mukanchand Bothra and HUF (2026), that word does two things: it makes the Act a complete code, and it fixes the procedure. Section 34 is therefore not just a remedy against an award, it is the exclusive one. An aggrieved party cannot slip into a writ court under Article 227 of the Constitution, or a revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, as an alternative route. In V.K. John, even a legal heir who had never been a party to the arbitration was told his proper remedy lay under Section 34, because a person stepping into the shoes of a deceased party inherits both the burden of the award and the right to challenge it.
The grounds for setting an award aside are themselves a closed list: a party under some incapacity; an invalid arbitration agreement; lack of proper notice or inability to present one’s case; an award that travels beyond the scope of the reference; an improperly constituted tribunal; a subject matter not capable of being arbitrated; or an award that conflicts with the public policy of India. For purely domestic awards, there is one extra ground: “patent illegality” on the face of the award. Beyond these, as Jan De Nul Dredging India (P) Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust (2026) held, “the arbitral award is not open for challenge under Section 34 of the Act on any other ground.”
Underlying all of it is Section 5, which declares that in matters governed by arbitration “no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided.” The seven-judge bench in the Interplay reference, quoted in Jabalpur Corridor, confirmed that this non-obstante clause was Parliament’s way of pruning the supervisory role of courts “to the bare minimum.” Minimum interference is the default setting of the entire statute.
The Stance Before Gayatri Balasamy: Set Aside, But Do Not Rewrite
For years the message from the courts was consistent: the court’s job under Section 34 is supervisory, not appellate. A court is not a second arbitrator. It does not reweigh the evidence, it does not choose between two reasonable readings of a contract, and it does not substitute its own commercial judgment for the tribunal’s.
This restraint runs through a long line of authority. In MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd. (2019), cited in both Jan De Nul and the NHAI land-acquisition appeals, the Court held that interference under Section 37 cannot travel beyond the limits of Section 34, and that a court “cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award.” Dyna Technologies v. Crompton Greaves (2019), quoted in Jabalpur Corridor, warned that awards “should not be interfered with in a casual and cavalier manner,” and that courts must defer to the tribunal “even if the reasoning provided in the award is implied,” unless the award is genuinely perverse. UHL Power Co. v. State of H.P. described the jurisdiction as “fairly narrow.”
The Jabalpur Corridor judgment distills the philosophy into a vivid image. The right to upset an award, it said, works like a “narrowing pyramid”: “Higher the Court, lesser is the propensity to interfere.” With each layer of appeal, the court’s approach must become “increasingly hands-off in order to protect the finality of the arbitral process.” That case is a textbook illustration: a state road corporation fought a Malaysian-backed concessionaire for nearly two decades, losing before the arbitral tribunal, the District Court, the High Court, and finally the Supreme Court, which refused to disturb concurrent findings and described the tribunal’s reading of the contract as “not only a plausible view, but the only possible view.”
The principle that “even if two views are possible” the tribunal’s view prevails is the spine of this whole approach. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corpn. v. Sanman Rice Mills (2024), relied on in Jabalpur Corridor, held that an award “cannot be disturbed only for the reason that… the other view which is also a possible view is a better view according to the appellate court.”
Gayatri Balasamy: From an Axe to a Scalpel
The trouble with the old position was that the court’s only tool was a blunt one. If part of an award was bad, the court often had to choose between letting the whole thing stand or knocking the whole thing down, even if most of it was sound. Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd. changed that.
The reasoning, as quoted in Jaksons Developers, rests on an old common-sense maxim, omne majus continet in se minus: the greater contains the lesser. If a court has the larger power to set aside an entire award, it must also possess the smaller, contained power to set aside only the offending, severable portion while preserving the valid remainder. The Constitution Bench thus recognised a limited power of modification: a court may sever the legally infirm part of an award, correct an obvious clerical, typographical or computational error, and adjust post-award interest in light of changed circumstances. The Supreme Court’s own extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution sits above all this.
The vital point, and the one that is most often missed, is what Gayatri Balasamy did not do. It did not turn Section 34 into an appeal. It gave the court a scalpel as well as an axe, but it did not lower the threshold for picking up either tool. Jabalpur Corridor itself cited Gayatri Balasamy for the narrow proposition that post-award interest is future-oriented and can, in a fit case, be revisited, yet still declined to reduce the interest there, holding that a contractually agreed rate, freely bargained, will not be second-guessed “unless the interest rate is so perverse and so unreasonable as to shock the conscience of this Court.”
The Stance After Gayatri Balasamy: A Sharper Tool, Same High Bar
Far from opening the floodgates, the judgments since Gayatri Balasamy show courts using the new power sparingly and continuing to guard arbitral finality. Jaksons Developers demonstrates the scalpel in action, severing a bad portion while keeping the good, but only because the infirm part was genuinely separable.
The two National Highways Authority of India decisions of the Bombay High Court are an instructive reminder that the high bar applies even in statutory arbitrations. These were land-acquisition disputes where landowners had won enhanced compensation before arbitrators appointed under the National Highways Act, 1956. The Authority pressed familiar merits arguments: that the arbitrator wrongly relied on a sale deed executed weeks after the acquisition notification, compared dissimilar plots, or awarded severance compensation without enough proof. The Court refused to interfere, holding that where an arbitrator has weighed the material and a District Court under Section 34 has declined to disturb it, an appellate court under Section 37 “would be slow to interfere.” Reappreciation of evidence, it stressed, “would not be permissible on the ground of patent illegality.”
One of those cases also shows how the special nature of statutory arbitration can shrink the room for technical challenges. The Authority argued that the award was a nullity because it was passed beyond the time limit in Section 29A of the Arbitration Act. Drawing on the Supreme Court’s decision in NHAI v. Sayedabad Tea Company and the Constitution Bench in Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, the Court held that the National Highways Act is a self-contained code, and that grafting Section 29A’s machinery, court-extended mandates and court-substituted arbitrators, onto a regime where only the Central Government appoints the arbitrator would render the scheme “unworkable.” The lesson is consistent: courts look for reasons to uphold awards, not to unravel them.
Jabalpur Corridor reinforces the same instinct on the question of jurisdiction. There, the losing party tried to resurrect a jurisdictional objection at the very end of the litigation, years after it had been raised, lost, and exhausted up to a review petition. The Supreme Court treated this as “a clear abuse of process,” holding that once a jurisdictional issue is “settled for eternity in the eye of law,” a later change in the law or an overruled precedent does not reopen a concluded matter. Finality, the Court said, is itself a “cherished value.”
The Scope of Intervention Today
Pulling the threads together, the current position can be stated with some confidence.
First, the grounds are closed. A court can act only on the grounds in Section 34(2): incapacity, an invalid agreement, denial of fair hearing, an award beyond the scope of reference, an improperly constituted tribunal, non-arbitrability, or conflict with the public policy of India, plus patent illegality on the face of a domestic award.
Second, the court does not sit in appeal. It will not reweigh evidence or pick between competing interpretations. As Jabalpur Corridor and the NHAI appeals both confirm through MMTC, the court “cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits.” The tribunal remains “the master of evidence and of interpretation of contractual terms,” and its plausible view is protected.
Third, “patent illegality” is a demanding standard, not a backdoor to a merits review. As the NHAI judgments explain through PSA Sical Terminals and Associate Builders, it bites only where a finding rests on no evidence, ignores vital evidence, or is so irrational that no reasonable person could have reached it; not merely where the court would have decided differently. A reasoned, speaking award that offends neither the fundamental policy of Indian law nor basic notions of morality and justice is safe.
Fourth, the remedy now includes a scalpel as well as an axe. After Gayatri Balasamy, a court can excise a severable, infirm portion while keeping the valid remainder, can correct obvious clerical or computational slips, and can revisit post-award interest in a fit case, but only where the defect genuinely warrants it and, in the case of severance, where the bad part is truly separable.
Fifth, the appellate stage under Section 37 is narrower still: the “narrowing pyramid” of Jabalpur Corridor. As Jan De Nul held, “if an award is not liable to be disturbed under Section 34… the same could not have been interfered with in exercise of powers under Section 37.” The appellate court only checks whether the Section 34 court stayed within its limits; it cannot enlarge the field of review. And as Jabalpur Corridor adds, where a party invokes the Supreme Court’s discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136, the threshold is higher again.
For any business weighing a challenge, the practical takeaway is plain. Section 34 is not a re-run of the arbitration, and dissatisfaction with the result, however strongly felt, is not a ground to set an award aside. Intervention is the exception, reserved for awards that are genuinely beyond the pale: those that breach the statute, violate public policy, deny a fair hearing, or rest on reasoning no reasonable mind could accept. Gayatri Balasamy has made the remedy more precise by letting courts excise the bad while keeping the good, but it has not loosened the threshold for getting through the door. Arbitration’s promise of finality, as the recent judgments make clear, remains very much intact.