Validity of an Arbitration Agreement Despite an Invalid Appointment Mechanism for an Arbitrator

November 18, 2026

By Shuchita Chaubey and Nihit Nagpal

Imagine entering a transaction where both parties specifically agree that the supporting affidavits, that form an essential part of the transaction, would be required to be notarised.  They further decide that the notarisation shall be done before a particular notary whom one party knows well and trusts, and to whom the other party expressly assents.  With the passage of time, it transpires that the said notary’s licence has lapsed, or that he / she has been disqualified from practice.  Should this subsequent development render the transaction to collapse or mean that the documents can now never be notarised?  No prudent individual would understand the situation in this manner.  The natural, and indeed simple, outcome would be to approach another qualified notary to complete the notarisation.  Arbitrations in our country, too, have shared a similar practice until subsequent developments intervened.  While contracts provided for arbitration as a mode of resolution of disputes, one of the parties usually was rested with the sole authority to appoint the arbitrator.  This was ofttimes a senior company officer or an in-house person of one of the parties (usually the dominant party in the contract) who was appointed to act as the sole arbitrator or was vested with the power to unilaterally choose an arbitrator unilaterally.  However, with subsequent developments in law, such as the introduction of Section 12(5) in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”) by way of Act 3 of 2016 (with effect from October 23, 2015), and the Seventh Schedule (defining the relationship of an arbitrator with the parties or their counsel), the appointment of such closely related individuals are now deemed as ineligible and this practice of unilateral appointment, too, has been rendered invalid.  The effect thereof is, succinctly, that the process must now be routed through a different, neutrally appointed arbitrator, without, in any manner whatsoever, affecting the parties’ underlying decision to submit disputes to arbitration (which remains untouched).

For many years, standard commercial contracts in India carried familiar arbitration clauses.  They recorded that disputes would be resolved by arbitration but then handed the actual power to appoint the arbitrator to the managing director, chairman, or an in-house officer of one of the (dominant) parties (as referenced under Section 16 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872).  This practice was particularly visible in the public sector, infrastructure contracts, loans and facility agreements.  At the time, it was defended on grounds of convenience and institutional knowledge.  The core commercial decision, however, was always the same.  The parties wanted to avoid ordinary civil suits and chose arbitration as their forum of first instance and the appointment mechanism was merely a practical pathway for reaching that forum.

In 2015, the Act was substantially amended, specifically with the intent of altering this very landscape in a very direct way.  Section 12(5), read with the Seventh Schedule, introduced a statutory test of ineligibility.  Simply put, if an individual falls within the listed categories, such as being a manager, director or employee of a party, that person simply cannot act as arbitrator.  This is not a matter of waiver in the usual sense, but a disqualification that operates notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary.  The Hon’ble Supreme Court in TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd.[1], made it clear that an ineligible person cannot even nominate an arbitrator, and Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd.[2], extended that reasoning to unilateral appointment models controlled by an interested party.  The result was that many traditional appointment mechanisms became unsustainable.  They did not, however, erase the parties’ decision to arbitrate.

A recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Offshore Infrastructures Limited v Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited[3] is a perfectly good example of how this problem has been purposefully approached.  In this case, the parties were bound by a works contract for a refinery project. The General Conditions of Contract (“GCC”) contained an arbitration clause that named the Managing Director or his nominee, as the arbitrator.  When disputes arose and the contractor invoked arbitration, it correctly pointed out that the Managing Director or any company officer would be ineligible in the light of Section 12(5).  The employer did not cooperate with the appointment of a neutral arbitrator, constraining the contractor’s to make an application under Section 11 of the Act before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, which, too, however, was dismissed on grounds of limitation.

In appeal, the Supreme Court first corrected the analysis on limitation by applying the principles in Geo Miller on the start of limitation in works contracts and by giving effect to the COVID extension orders Suo Motu Writ Petition in Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation[4].  More importantly, it addressed the status of the arbitration clause itself.  The employer’s argument was that since the named appointing authority had become ineligible, the entire arbitration mechanism had ceased to exist.  The Court rejected this.  It held that the agreement to refer disputes to arbitration is the core element of the clause.  The method of appointing the arbitrator is an ancillary element which must yield to the statute.  If the original method has become unworkable because the Managing Director is ineligible under Section 12(5), the court can step in under Section 11 and appoint an independent arbitrator.  The arbitration agreement does not vanish simply because one part of the clause has fallen foul of later developments in law.

The Delhi High Court, too, in shortly before Offshore, in Intec Capital Ltd. v. Frontline Retail India (P) Ltd.[5], applied the same reasoning, though in a slightly different setting.  There, a lender and borrower had a business loan agreement with an arbitration clause that effectively allowed the lender to control appointment through its own panel.  Acting under that clause, the lender had earlier unilaterally appointed an arbitrator and obtained an award.  Once the law on unilateral appointments was settled after Perkins and related decisions, the lender withdrew its execution petition and issued a fresh notice under Section 21.  This time it did not appoint anyone.  Instead, it proposed that a sole arbitrator be chosen from the panel of the Delhi International Arbitration Centre (DIAC).  Alongside this, it filed a petition under Section 9 of the Act seeking security.  The Commercial Court dismissed the Section 9 petition on the ground that the arbitration clause itself was void from the beginning because it envisaged unilateral appointment.  In effect, it treated the illegality of the earlier appointment as infecting the entire clause.  The Hon’ble Division Bench of the High Court, however, disagreed.  It pointed out that the Supreme Court has, in several cases, invalidated unilateral appointments while still acting on the underlying arbitration agreement by appointing a neutral arbitrator.  The High Court emphasised that the parties’ intention to resolve disputes through arbitration remains intact and the only part that becomes unworkable is the unilateral appointment mechanism.  In Intec, the fresh notice under Section 21 no longer relied on that mechanism and instead proposed a neutral institutional route.  That was sufficient to keep the arbitration agreement alive and to support a petition under Section 9 of the interim reliefs.  The matter was remitted for consideration of interim relief on merits.

Read together, Offshore and Intec tell a simple but important story.  Where parties have chosen arbitration, courts are reluctant to allow outdated or illegal appointment procedures to derail that choice.  The statute itself now recognises that some individuals, particularly those too closely aligned with one party, are ineligible to act as arbitrators or to nominate them.  While that ineligibility is taken seriously and courts will not permit such people to control the process, they are equally clear that this does not mean the agreement to arbitrate is lost completely.  The limb of the clause towards appointment is treated as if the chosen notary has lost his licence.  A new, neutral notary is found in the form of the court or an arbitral institution, and the parties’ original decision to arbitrate is given effect.

Practically, if a contract names, for example, a Managing Director, chairman or in house officer as an arbitrator or appointing authority, it is still worthwhile to invoke arbitration and approach the court under Section 11 of the Act, if necessary, relying on Offshore to say that only the appointment mechanism has failed, not the agreement itself.  If a client has already obtained an award on the basis of a unilateral appointment that is now vulnerable, Intec shows that it may be safer to abandon that award, issue a fresh notice that proposes a neutral appointment, and proceed with a new reference under the same arbitration clause.  While these developments are now publicised well, it is still recommended to abandon internal and unilateral appointment models altogether and move towards institutional rules or balanced procedures that clearly respect Section 12(5) of the Act.

The Offshore judgment also enhances fairness by clarifying the role of judicial intervention. Courts are not meant to rewrite contracts, nor are they meant to let flawed mechanisms derail arbitration. Their role is to preserve the contractual intention wherever possible. When the appointment method fails, a court appointed arbitrator offers a neutral and balanced solution. This reinforces confidence that the process will not be influenced by one party’s historical control over appointment structures.

In essence, these decisions hold ground on what truly matters is the parties’ intent and decision to submit their disputes to arbitration, and not the process of arbitration or the particular personality or internal office through whom the tribunal was originally to be constituted.  If the named notary has lost his licence, the law requires the parties to find another, it does not tear up the document or invalidate it entirely.  Offshore and Intec adopt the same approach for arbitration clauses as they separate the core agreement to arbitrate from the limb of appointment, and discard only what conflicts with Section 12(5), while allowing courts or institutions to fill the gap.

[1] (2017) 8 SCC 377

[2] (2020) 20 SCC 760

[3] 2025 INSC 1196

[4] (Civil) No.3 of 2020

[5] 2025 SCC OnLine Del 7719

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