Delhi High Court Refers Conflicting Territorial Jurisdiction Jurisprudence to a Larger Bench

By Vikrant Rana and Rima Majumdar

Introduction

In a comparative advertising dispute between Hindustan Unilever Limited (“HUL” or the “Plaintiff”) and Kwick Living (I) Private Limited (“Kwick Living” or the “Defendant”), a single Judge of the Delhi high court, vide order dated 25 August 2026, referred to a large bench the question of territorial jurisdiction in IP suits, due to multiple, conflicting precedents on when a court can entertain a case on the ground of website accessibility only.

Confronted a preliminary and recurring question that has divided its own case law for over a decade: where a corporate plaintiff’s registered/principal office and the cause of action both lie outside Delhi, but the plaintiff also carries on business in Delhi and the impugned conduct is disseminated on the internet does the Delhi high court possess territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit?  The court referred the matter to a larger bench holding that the existing precedents of the Delhi high court disclose an unresolved conflict that ought to be authoritatively settled.

Factual and Procedural Background

HUL instituted the suit seeking a permanent injunction restraining Kwick Living from broadcasting, publishing, hosting or communicating to the public an advertisement campaign styled as a public awareness initiative under the banner “War on What’s Hidden”. HUL’s case was that the campaign targeted and disparaged its products ‘Vim’ and ‘Surf Excel’ on the basis of unsubstantiated and misleading claims.

At the stage of issuance of summons, Kwick Living who was appearing on advance notice, raised a preliminary objection on whether the Delhi High Court has territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. After filing of submissions on this limited extent, the Court reserved its judgment on the question of jurisdiction first, while deferring consideration of the merits of the interim injunction application.

The Court framed the jurisdictional question as turning on the interplay of three provisions: Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999; Section 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957; and Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), in particular Section 20(c).

Submissions on Behalf of the Defendant (Kwick Living)

• The plaint contained no specific averment of any cause of action arising in Delhi.
• On the contrary, the plaint admitted that HUL had, to date, been able to confirm only an instance of the impugned hoarding in Mumbai.
• Both HUL’s registered office and Kwick Living’s registered office are situated in Mumbai, which is the undisputed principal place of business of both parties.
• Relying on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia, (2015) 10 SCC 161, it was submitted that where the cause of action also arises at the place of the plaintiff’s principal office, the plaintiff is bound to sue only at that place, and Sections 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act and 62(2) of the Copyright Act do not create an additional forum at a place where the plaintiff merely has a subordinate office.
• This position was further systematised by the Division Bench in Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Purushottam Kumar Chaubey, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 376, which laid down four fact-scenarios governing when a plaintiff with a principal and a subordinate office may or may not sue at the place of the subordinate office.
• On the question of accessibility of the advertisement on digital platforms, reliance was placed on the Division Bench decision in Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780, which held that mere accessibility of a website within a forum does not confer jurisdiction, the plaintiff must show that the defendant “purposefully availed” of the forum by “specifically targeting” it, and, where the ‘effects test’ is invoked, must show an injurious effect within the forum. No averment of purposeful availment by Kwick Living was made in the plaint.
• Reliance was also placed on Federal Express Corporation v. FedEx Securities Limited & Ors., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 7824 (following Banyan Tree), and on Escorts Limited v. Tejpal Singh Sisodia, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 7607, drawing a parallel between suits for corporate defamation and suits for trade mark disparagement to argue against expansive, internet-based fora.

On this basis, it was submitted that HUL was bound to institute the suit only in Mumbai, and that the Delhi High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain it.

Submissions on Behalf of the Plaintiff (HUL)

• While HUL’s registered office is in Mumbai, HUL also maintains a corporate office in Delhi, and on a proper reading of Section 20(c) of the CPC and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, Delhi is a place where the cause of action has also arisen, making it available as a forum.
• The impugned campaign was disseminated on YouTube and Instagram and on Kwick Living’s own webpage — all accessible in Delhi — and the webpage allowed consumers to purchase Kwick Living’s products, thereby generating commercial effect within Delhi.
• Reliance was placed on Burger King v. Techchand Shewakramani, (2018) 1 HCC (Del) 64, for the proposition that Sections 134 of the Trade Marks Act and 62 of the Copyright Act operate in addition to, and not in exclusion of, Section 20 CPC, and that “use” of a mark — including through advertising, promotion and publicity — constitutes the cause of action wherever such use occurs, so that a cause of action can arise in “each and every place” where the mark is used.
• Reliance was also placed on Kohinoor Seed Fields India (P) Ltd. v. Veda Seed Sciences (P) Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 8727, which held that the existence of an interactive website capable of concluding a commercial transaction is sufficient to amount to “carrying on business” at the place of access — actual completion of a transaction no longer being indispensable following World Wrestling Entertainment — and that this reasoning applies equally to a defendant’s website for the purpose of Section 20(a) CPC.
• Further reliance was placed on Nilesh Girkar v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 6040 (nation-wide OTT dissemination held to generate a part cause of action in Delhi); Astral Ltd. v. Ajay Enterprises, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 10065 (concurrent jurisdiction where cause of action arises at both principal and subordinate office locations); Rukhmani Keshwani v. Raju Agarbatti Works & Anr., 2026 SCC OnLine Del 4904 and ITC Ltd. & Anr. v. Adyar Gate Hotels Ltd., 2026 SCC OnLine Del 4852 (both cautioning against a mechanical application of Sanjay Dalia where independent and substantive elements of the cause of action arise within the forum); and Travellers Exchange Corporation Limited & Others v. Celebrities Management Private Limited, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 6943 (holding that Sanjay Dalia applies only where jurisdiction is invoked under Sections 62/134, and not where it is independently invoked under Section 20 CPC).
• It was also argued that the Explanation to Section 20 CPC — deeming a corporation to carry on business at a place where its subordinate office is situate if the cause of action arises there — applies only to Section 20(a) and (b), and has no bearing on Section 20(c); and that Sanjay Dalia was concerned only with Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act and Section 62 of the Copyright Act, not with Section 20 CPC.

On this basis, HUL contended that since the effect of the impugned advertisement was felt in Delhi and its products (as well as Kwick Living’s competing products) were available for sale in Delhi, HUL was entitled to invoke the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court.

The Court’s Reasoning and Reference to a Larger Bench

1. The Supreme Court’s position in Sanjay Dalia

   The Court noted that Sanjay Dalia lays down a restrictive, purposive reading: where a corporation’s principal office is at a place and a part of the cause of action also arises there, the corporation must sue at that place and cannot invoke a distant forum merely because it has a subordinate office or carries on business there. Sections 134(2) and 62(2) were held to only remove the impediment that would otherwise require a plaintiff to sue where the defendant resides or the cause of action arises — they were not intended to permit a plaintiff to abandon its principal-office forum where the cause of action has also arisen.

2. The conflict among Delhi High Court decisions

   The Court observed that Banyan Tree and World Wrestling Entertainment (both pre-dating Sanjay Dalia) address different questions: Banyan Tree lays down a stringent “purposeful availment” and “specific targeting” test for cause of action under Section 20(c) in internet-based disputes, rejecting mere accessibility as sufficient; whereas World Wrestling Entertainment addresses the distinct question of when a plaintiff may be said to “carry on business” at a place, holding that an interactive website capable of concluding transactions suffices.

   Ultra Home Construction was found to apply Sanjay Dalia and to systematise the law through four corporate-office fact-scenarios. Burger King, by contrast, proceeds on the footing that Sections 134/62 operate in addition to Section 20 CPC and that “use” of a mark — including through advertising and publicity — generates a cause of action in every place of such use, a position the Court found to be in practical conflict with Banyan Tree’s insistence on purposeful targeting.

   Kohinoor Seed Fields was found to draw upon, and expand, World Wrestling Entertainment’s treatment of “carrying on business” (rather than “cause of action”) in the e-commerce context, while the Division Bench in that case expressed reservations — albeit without formally deciding the point — about the correctness of Ultra Home Construction’s four-scenario framework. The Court also noted the direct conflict between the approach attributed to Nilesh Girkar (nation-wide OTT dissemination generating a part cause of action wherever content is accessible) and Banyan Tree’s targeted-activity-plus-injury test, as well as the tension between Astral Limited’s recognition of concurrent jurisdiction at both principal and subordinate offices and Sanjay Dalia’s insistence that the principal-office forum, once seized of part of the cause of action, ousts other fora.

3. Reference to a Larger Bench

   Having mapped these divergent lines of authority, the Court held that, in the interests of certainty and consistency, the question would appropriately merit consideration by a Larger Bench, and referred the following questions for determination:

   • Whether IP suits are governed solely by Section 20 CPC; by Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act; or Section 62 of the Copyright Act, or by an interplay of all those provisions, and if so, how.
   • Whether a corporate plaintiff must sue only where its principal or registered office is situate when a part of the cause of action has arisen there.
   • What jurisdictional rule should govern online transactions in IP disputes, in light of the conflicting approaches taken in Banyan Tree, World Wrestling Entertainment, and Kohinoor Seed Fields.

   The Court cautioned that the principles governing territorial jurisdiction cannot be so diluted, on account of the accessibility of goods over the internet, that a corporation could sue in virtually any location within the country without reference to where the cause of action has actually arisen, as that would “throw the very concept of territorial jurisdiction of courts to the winds.”

Key Takeaways for IP Rights Holders

• Until the Larger Bench rules on these questions on territorial jurisdiction, rights holders should expect continued preliminary objections to jurisdiction in Delhi, particularly where their principal or registered office, and a discernible part of the cause of action, lie outside Delhi.
• Plaintiffs whose principal/registered office is outside Delhi, but who also maintain a corporate or subordinate office in Delhi, should not assume that the existence of a Delhi office alone will suffice; pleadings should affirmatively and specifically plead the factual basis for a Delhi-specific cause of action (e.g., targeted advertising, transactable e-commerce presence, or actual instances of the impugned conduct occurring in Delhi) rather than relying on general averments of nationwide or online accessibility.
• Where the cause of action is sought to be founded on digital dissemination (websites, social media, OTT platforms), plaintiffs should plead, with specificity, facts going to “purposeful availment” and “specific targeting” of the forum (as required under Banyan Tree), and not rely solely on the broader “accessibility/transactability” reasoning of World Wrestling Entertainment or Kohinoor Seed Fields, since the former line of authority remains good law and has not been overruled.
• Where the plaintiff’s own principal place of business and a part of the cause of action coincide at a place other than Delhi, litigants should carefully assess, before filing, whether Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home Construction may operate to confine the suit to that place, notwithstanding a Delhi presence or Delhi-accessible online activity.
• Defendants facing suits in a forum where they have no presence should closely scrutinise the plaint’s cause-of-action and jurisdiction paragraphs for specific (as opposed to general or conclusory) averments of purposeful targeting, actual sales, or concluded transactions within the forum, as the absence of such averments remains a substantial ground for a jurisdictional challenge under the existing (albeit conflicting) case-law.
• Given the reference, rights holders with pending or contemplated suits in Delhi founded on an online cause of action should monitor the constitution and outcome of the Larger Bench, as its ruling is likely to materially affect both the choice of forum in future IP litigation and the sustainability of existing suits where jurisdiction has been contested.
• As a prudent interim measure, plaintiffs may consider pleading jurisdiction on multiple, alternative grounds (Section 20(c) CPC cause-of-action facts, Section 134(2)/62(2) principal-office/carries-on-business facts, and specific targeting/e-commerce facts) so that the suit is not rendered vulnerable regardless of which line of authority the Larger Bench ultimately endorses.