By Swaraj Singh Raghuwanshi and Nishu Adityaa
Introduction
National security has been a cornerstone of India’s patent legislation since its inception. Section 4 of the Indian Patents Act, 1970, exemplifies this priority by imposing an absolute bar on patenting inventions related to atomic energy. This prohibition has historically reflected the government’s exclusive control over nuclear technology and the strategic sensitivity associated with atomic energy. However, India’s evolving clean-energy objectives are driving a significant policy transformation.
Emerging policy discussions and proposed legislative frameworks—commonly referred to as the “Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India Act, 2025” (SHANTI Act)—signal a potential departure from absolute prohibition toward conditional patenting. This transition represents an effort to harmonise innovation incentives with sovereign control over sensitive technologies.
Section 4 of the Indian Patents Act, 1970: A Security-Driven Exclusion:
Section 4 of the Indian Patents Act, 1970 establishes that no patent shall be granted for inventions relating to atomic energy as defined under sub-section (1) of section 20 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962. Although narrowly drafted, this provision creates a comprehensive exclusionary effect within the patent ecosystem, operating as a statutory bar irrespective of whether the invention satisfies novelty, inventive step, or industrial applicability requirements[1].
Section 20(1) of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 specifies that patents shall not be granted for inventions which, in the Central Government’s opinion, are useful for or relate to the production, control, use or disposal of atomic energy; the prospecting, mining, extraction, production, physical or chemical treatment of prescribed substances; the fabrication, enrichment, canning or use of any prescribed substance or radioactive substance; or ensuring safety in atomic energy operations.
Section 65 of the Indian Patents Act, 1970 further reinforces this framework by empowering the Central Government to revoke any granted patent subsequently found to relate to atomic energy in contravention of Section 20 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962.
The SHANTI Act, 2025: Re-imagining India’s Nuclear Legal Architecture:
Policy frameworks collectively referred to as the SHANTI Act, 2025, propose a fundamental restructuring of India’s nuclear governance architecture. These proposals contemplate modernising the existing legal regime governing nuclear energy, encompassing the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010.
The principal objectives articulated in these policy proposals include enabling limited private sector participation in peaceful nuclear activities and rationalising regulatory frameworks to foster clean-energy innovation. The proposed framework aims to recalibrate rather than diminish State control. Strategic and sensitive domains would remain under sovereign authority, while non-strategic civilian applications would experience measured liberalisation.[2]
Conditional Patentability under the Proposed SHANTI Framework:
The most consequential proposed change in the patent law context is the introduction of a conditional patentability regime for inventions relating to peaceful applications of nuclear energy and radiation. This represents a fundamental departure from the absolute prohibition currently enshrined in Section 4 of the Patents Act.
This proposed liberalisation would operate subject to rigorous conditions and regulatory oversight. Applications would be restricted to civilian domains including medicine, agriculture, waste treatment, water purification, and clean power generation (Limitation to Peaceful Use). Technologies with defence, weapons, or strategic implications would remain categorically excluded (Strategic and Sensitive Exclusions). Patent applications involving nuclear-related subject matter would be referred by the Controller General of Patents to the Central Government, which may conduct inspections, impose conditions, or direct refusal (Mandatory Government Vetting). Inventors would be obligated to notify the Central Government prior to any third-party disclosure, ensuring sensitive information remains subject to regulatory oversight (Pre-Disclosure Obligations).
This framework represents a transition from blanket prohibition to a gatekeeper model, permitting innovation within clearly delineated and supervised parameters.
Innovation Meets Regulation: Why This Shift Matters:
Contemporary nuclear technology applications extend substantially beyond power generation. Nuclear technology now plays an essential role in cancer diagnostics and radiotherapy, food irradiation and preservation, water desalination, agricultural productivity enhancement, and climate-resilient clean-energy systems.
Maintaining an absolute patent bar across these domains risks deterring private research and development, international collaboration, and domestic innovation. Conditional patent protection under governmental oversight is therefore positioned as a mechanism to stimulate investment while preserving State primacy over strategic assets.
Implications for Patent Drafting and Prosecution Strategy:
This evolving policy landscape necessitates a fundamental reconsideration of drafting and prosecution approaches. The previous strategy of minimising or obscuring nuclear context to circumvent Section 4 may become counterproductive under the new regime. Patent specifications should instead emphasise technical completeness and accuracy, with explicit identification of civilian and peaceful applications. Where technologies possess dual-use potential, such characteristics should be transparently disclosed.
Practitioners should integrate sensitivity assessment at the invention-disclosure stage to ensure early identification of nuclear linkages and compliance with proposed pre-disclosure obligations. Drafting strategies should deliberately highlight design features that limit potential misuse and demonstrate suitability for safeguarded, non-strategic deployment.
Conclusion:
The conceptual evolution from Section 4 of the Indian Patents Act to a proposed conditional patentability framework under the SHANTI model reflects India’s transition from a purely security-centric approach to a security-plus-innovation paradigm. While the earlier regime prioritised exclusion to safeguard sovereignty, the emerging approach favours regulated inclusion to support sustainable development.
The proposed SHANTI framework does not compromise national security; it refines the approach to security. By enabling patent protection for peaceful nuclear inventions under stringent governmental oversight, India signals a calibrated embrace of clean-energy innovation without sacrificing strategic autonomy.
For inventors, investors, and policymakers, this marks a foundational transformation—from prohibition to permission, from monopoly to managed participation, and from secrecy to supervised innovation.