By Vikrant Rana and Ananyaa Banerjee
Introduction
In M/s Raj Abhushan Bhandar v. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr., the Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, comprising the Hon’ble Chief Justice Mrs. Sunita Agarwal and the Hon’ble Justice Mr. D.N. Ray, has authoritatively settled a question of considerable practical significance for trade mark litigants: whether a further, intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies against a judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court passed in a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, against an order of the Registrar of Trade Marks.
The judgment delivered in R/Letters Patent Appeal No. 619 of 2026 (with connected R/Letters Patent Appeal No. 620 of 2026) was reserved on April 27, 2026 and pronounced on July 23, 2026. The Court answered the question in the negative, holding that such intra-court appeals are not maintainable, and in doing so has aligned itself with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, while expressly declining to follow a contrary view of the Delhi High Court on the point.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The appeals arose from a common judgment and order dated July 11, 2025, passed by a learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court in a statutory appeal filed under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. That statutory appeal had itself been directed against an order dated February 27, 2023 passed by the Trade Marks Registry, Ahmedabad.
Aggrieved by the Single Judge’s judgment, the Appellant preferred Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, together with applications for stay. At the very outset, a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeals was raised on behalf of the Respondents.
THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION AND THE QUESTIONS FRAMED
The Respondents’ objection rested on a combination of three strands: (a) the legislative scheme of Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which — unlike its predecessor, Section 109 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 — does not expressly provide for a second appeal; (b) Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), which bars any further appeal where an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order has been heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, “notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent”; and (c) the language of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent itself, which excludes an intra-court appeal against a judgment passed by a Single Judge in the exercise of appellate (as opposed to original) jurisdiction.
The Appellant, in rebuttal, relied on a body of precedent, beginning with the Supreme Court’s 1953 decision in National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd., for the proposition that once a statutory appeal reaches the High Court without any procedure being prescribed for its further conduct, it is governed by the ordinary rules of practice of that Court, including the general right of a further appeal under the Letters Patent, absent an express provision to the contrary.
After hearing the parties, the Division Bench framed the issue in terms of three interlinked questions:
- whether the Registrar, in the exercise of its adjudicatory powers and functions under the Act, can be said to be a tribunal having the trappings of a Civil Court;
- if so, what is the impact and effect of Section 100A of the CPC on the present proceedings; and
- whether, as a result, an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is maintainable against the order of a Single Judge exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 91 of the Act.
IS THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS A TRIBUNAL WITH “TRAPPINGS OF A COURT”?
The Court undertook a detailed examination of the scheme of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, noting in particular:
- under Section 127 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the Registrar has “all the powers of a civil court” for receiving evidence, administering oaths, enforcing attendance of witnesses, and compelling discovery and production of documents, and may pass orders as to costs that are executable as a decree of a civil court;
- under Section 129, evidence in proceedings before the Registrar is ordinarily given by affidavit, though the Registrar may take oral evidence and permit cross-examination;
- under Rules 33, 45 to 50 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, a detailed adjudicatory procedure is set out for examination, filing of opposition, exchange and closure of evidence, and a formal hearing culminating in a reasoned, written decision communicated to the parties.
Applying the tests laid down by the Constitution Bench in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma, namely, whether the adjudicating power exercised by an authority has been conferred on it by statute and can be described as part of the State’s inherent judicial power, with the presence of the procedural “trappings” of a court serving as an assistive (though not decisive) indicator, the Bench held that the Registrar’s decision to accept or reject a registration directly determines the legal rights and liabilities of the Applicant and, in opposition proceedings, of both parties, which is “an essential characteristic of a judicial function.”
On this basis, the Court expressly agreed with the reasoning of the Division Bench (Letters Patent Bench) of the Calcutta High Court in Glorious Investment Ltd. v. Dunlop International Ltd., holding that the Registrar of Trade Marks, while exercising powers and functions under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, acts as a tribunal having “trappings of a Court,” even though it is not a court of civil judicature stricto sensu.
EFFECT OF SECTION 100A OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Having answered the first question in the affirmative, the Court turned to Section 100A of the CPC, which provides that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from that judgment, “notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court.”
The Bench held that once the Registrar is recognised as a tribunal having trappings of a court, an appeal against its order decided by a Single Judge under Section 91 falls squarely within the scope of Section 100A, and the non-obstante clause in that provision overrides the general appellate power otherwise available under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The Court further construed the specific exclusionary language of Clause 15 itself, which does not extend to a judgment passed “in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court”, as independently pointing to the same conclusion.
The Bench also placed weight on the legislative history of the appellate provision itself. Section 109 of the erstwhile Act had expressly provided for two tiers of appeal to the High Court: a first appeal to a Single Judge under sub-section (4), and a further appeal to a Division Bench under sub-section (5). Section 91 of the present Act, by contrast, provides for only one appeal. Even the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, which substituted ‘High Court’ for ‘Appellate Board’ in Section 91 with effect from April 04, 2021, left the remainder of the provision, including the absence of any second-appeal mechanism, untouched. The Court treated this conscious omission of a second-appeal forum, carried forward even through subsequent amendment, as reinforcing the legislative intent against providing for an intra-court appeal.
TREATMENT OF PRECEDENT: ALIGNING WITH CALCUTTA, DEPARTING FROM DELHI
- National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. (1953) — Distinguished
The Court held that the question decided in National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. — the maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal against an order under Section 76 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 — was “completely different and distinct” from the questions before it, principally because that decision predates the introduction of Section 100A of the CPC in 2002. The Bench accordingly treated the ratio of that decision as of limited assistance to the present controversy. - Decisions Considered on Maintainability
- Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar, (2002) 3 SCC 705 — Held that a substantive right of appeal under a Letters Patent is not excluded unless the concerned statute does so expressly or by necessary intendment; considered in the context of Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
- Subal Paul v. Malina Paul, (2003) 10 SCC 361 — Held a Letters Patent Appeal maintainable against a Single Judge’s order under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, applying similar reasoning to Sharda Devi.
- Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd., (2011) 8 SCC 333 — Held that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 being a self-contained and exhaustive code, no Letters Patent Appeal lies against an order not appealable under Section 50 thereof.
- Ram Kishan Fauji v. State of Haryana, (2017) 5 SCC 533 — Held that a Letters Patent Appeal does not lie against a Single Judge’s order in a writ petition that, in substance, invoked the High Court’s jurisdiction over an appellate officer’s order under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
- Promoshirt SM SA v. Armassuisse, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 5531 — Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held, without examining whether the Registrar has ‘trappings of a court’, that since Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 does not subject the appeal to CPC procedure, Section 100A does not bar a Letters Patent Appeal against a Single Judge’s order thereunder.
- Glorious Investment Ltd. v. Dunlop International Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine Cal 8647 — Division Bench (Letters Patent Bench) of the Calcutta High Court, relying on Kamal Kumar Dutta v. Ruby General Hospital Ltd., (2006) 7 SC 613, held that the Registrar has “almost all the trappings of a Court” and that a Letters Patent Appeal against a Single Judge’s order under Section 91 is barred by Section 100A of the CPC. The Gujarat High Court adopted this reasoning.
- Italfarmaco SPA v. Controller of Patents & Designs, 2025 SCC OnLine Mad 13148 — Madras High Court held that an intra-court appeal under Section 15 of its Letters Patent does not lie against a Single Judge’s order under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970, given the specific appellate mechanism under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
- Vishal Prafulsingh Solanki & Ors. v. Controller of Patent and Designs & Ors., 2026–OS 7027–DB — Bombay High Court held that the Controller of Patents, in the discharge of powers under Section 77 & 79–80 of the Patents Act, 1970, is a tribunal with trappings of a civil court, and no second appeal lies to a Division Bench against a Single Judge’s order under Section 117A.
- Northern Railways v. Harleen Kaur, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 1317 — Delhi High Court held that a Letters Patent Appeal does not lie against a Single Judge’s decision in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, that jurisdiction being supervisory rather than original.
- Nashik Hing Supplying Company v. Annapurna Gruh Udyog Bhandar, 2003(0) AIJEL–HC 208406 — This Court had earlier held, under the pre-2021 statutory scheme (Section 109(5) of the Act of 1958), that Section 100A does not bar a statutory appeal to a Division Bench where the authority under appeal is not a civil court, a decision that, on the present reasoning, is confined to that distinct pre-2021 statutory appeal structure.
FINDINGS AND OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS
On a conspectus of the above, the Division Bench held as follows:
- The Registrar of Trade Marks, while exercising powers under Chapter III of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 in the matter of registration of trade marks, exercises quasi-judicial power and, having regard to Sections 127 and 129 of the Act and the procedure prescribed under the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, functions as a tribunal having “trappings of a court,” though not a court of civil judicature;
- The language of Section 100A of the CPC does not confine the exclusion of the Letters Patent right of appeal to matters arising under the CPC alone, and extends to appeals arising under special statutory enactments;
- Under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, an intra-court appeal lies only against a judgment passed by a Single Judge in the exercise of original jurisdiction, and not against a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over a decree or order made by a court (or tribunal with trappings of a court) subject to the High Court’s superintendence;
- The exercise of power by a Single Judge under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 is appellate, not original, in character; accordingly, a Letters Patent Appeal against such an order is barred by Section 100A of the CPC; and
- The legislature’s conscious omission, carried through the 1999 Act and preserved even after the 2021 amendment, of the second-appeal mechanism that had existed under Section 109(5) of the Act of 1958, reinforces the conclusion that no further appeal to a Division Bench was intended.
The Bench distinguished the Delhi High Court’s decision in Promoshirt SM SA on the basis that it did not examine whether the Registrar possesses “trappings of a court” and did not consider the Supreme Court’s decision in Kamal Kumar Dutta. It likewise distinguished the Delhi High Court’s decision in Resilient Innovations (P) Ltd. v. Phonepe (P) Ltd. on the ground that it concerned rectification proceedings under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which the High Court hears as original, not appellate, proceedings, and which therefore fall outside the scope of both Section 100A of the CPC and the relevant exclusion in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
Accordingly, both Letters Patent Appeals were dismissed as not maintainable, with no order as to costs. The Court expressly clarified that it had not entered into the merits of the Appellant’s claims, and that all rights and contentions of the parties on the merits of the Registrar’s order and the Single Judge’s judgment remain open in any further, appropriately constituted challenge.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
- Registrar recognised as a tribunal with trappings of a court: This finding has a bearing beyond the maintainability question, as it clarifies how Registrar proceedings are characterised.
- No second appeal to a Division Bench: A party aggrieved by a Single Judge’s decision in a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 against a Registrar’s order cannot pursue a further intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent before the Division Bench of the High Court; the Single Judge’s decision is, for practical purposes, final at the High Court level.
- Rectification proceedings remain unaffected: The ruling does not disturb the maintainability of Letters Patent Appeals against Single Judge orders passed in rectification proceedings under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which the High Court exercises as original jurisdiction.
- Practical implication for litigants: Parties intending to challenge an adverse appellate order under Section 91 before the High Court should evaluate alternative remedies (such as a petition before the Supreme Court) at an early stage, rather than assume the availability of an intra-court appeal.
- Emerging inter-High Court divergence: The Gujarat High Court’s alignment with the Calcutta High Court’s Glorious Investment line, and its explicit departure from the Delhi High Court’s Promoshirt SM SA line, creates a live divergence of judicial opinion on this question across jurisdictions, which may eventually warrant resolution by the Supreme Court.
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