By Lucy Rana, Nihit Nagpal & Shuchita Chaubey
Arbitration | Sections 34 and 37 | Supreme Court of India | November 2026
In brief
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When parties agree to arbitrate, they strike a deliberate bargain. They take their dispute out of the ordinary courts and place it before a tribunal of their choosing, in exchange for speed, neutrality and, above all, finality. In practice, the losing party often believes the award is wrong and asks a court to correct it. That raises one of the most important questions in Indian arbitration law: when an arbitral award is challenged, how much can the court actually do?
The question is not academic. It determines whether the time and cost invested in arbitration buys genuine closure or simply opens the door to years of further litigation. In Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corridor Pvt. Ltd., 2026 INSC 590, decided on 29 May 2026, the Supreme Court of India opened its judgment with the observation that arbitration in India has not failed, but that courts have sometimes failed arbitration. This article explains what Section 34 permits, how the law stood before Gayatri Balasamy, what that judgment changed, and where the scope of intervention stands today.
What does Section 34 of the Arbitration Act allow?
Section 34(1) provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside the award. Section 5 reinforces this: in matters governed by Part I, no judicial authority shall intervene except where the Act so provides. A seven-judge Bench of the Supreme Court, in the reference on the interplay between arbitration agreements and the Indian Stamp Act, described this as Parliament’s choice to keep judicial supervision to a minimum.
In V.K. John v. S. Mukanchand Bothra and HUF, 2026 INSC 393, decided on 20 April 2026, the Supreme Court confirmed that the Act is a complete code and that Section 34 is the exclusive remedy against an award. A party cannot bypass it through a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution or a revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In that case, a person claiming to be the legal heir of a deceased party, who had challenged the award before the Madras High Court under Article 227, was directed to the Section 34 route instead.
The closed list of grounds
An award may be set aside only if the applicant establishes one of the grounds in Section 34(2), or if the court finds one of the grounds in Section 34(2)(b):
- a party was under some incapacity;
- the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties subjected it;
- the applicant was not given proper notice or was otherwise unable to present its case;
- the award deals with a dispute outside, or decisions beyond, the scope of the submission to arbitration;
- the composition of the tribunal or the procedure was not in accordance with the agreement or Part I;
- the subject matter is not capable of settlement by arbitration; or
- the award conflicts with the public policy of India.
For domestic awards (other than international commercial arbitrations), Section 34(2A) adds patent illegality appearing on the face of the award, with the express caveat that an award is not to be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence. The application must be filed within three months of receipt of the award, extendable by no more than thirty days on sufficient cause under Section 34(3). In Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust, 2026 INSC 34, decided on 7 January 2026, the Supreme Court reiterated that an award cannot be challenged on any ground outside this statutory list.
The position before Gayatri Balasamy: set aside, but do not rewrite
For years the message from the Supreme Court was consistent: the jurisdiction under Section 34 is supervisory, not appellate. In MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163, the Court held that a Section 34 court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award, and that interference under Section 37 cannot travel beyond the limits of Section 34. Dyna Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd., (2019) 20 SCC 1, cautioned against casual interference and required courts to give effect even to implied reasoning unless the award is perverse. UHL Power Company Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2022) 4 SCC 116, described the jurisdiction as fairly narrow, and narrower still at the Section 37 stage.
The principle that the tribunal’s view prevails where two views are possible runs through this line of authority. In Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. v. Sanman Rice Mills (2024), the Supreme Court held that an award cannot be disturbed merely because the appellate court considers another possible view to be better. On patent illegality, Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 3 SCC 49, Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131 and PSA Sical Terminals Pvt. Ltd. v. Board of Trustees of V.O. Chidambranar Port Trust, Tuticorin (2021) confined the ground to findings based on no evidence, findings that ignore vital evidence, and reasoning so irrational that no reasonable person could reach it.
The difficulty with this position was that the court had only one tool. If part of an award was flawed, the court faced a choice between upholding the whole award or setting the whole of it aside, even where most of it was sound. In Project Director, NHAI v. M. Hakeem, (2021) 9 SCC 1, the Supreme Court had held that Section 34 did not permit modification at all.
Gayatri Balasamy: from an axe to a scalpel
On 30 April 2025, a five-judge Constitution Bench in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd., 2025 INSC 605, resolved the conflict. The dispute arose from an employment matter in which an arbitral tribunal awarded Ms. Balasamy ₹2 crore, and the Madras High Court subsequently altered the amount. Speaking through Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna, the majority applied the maxim omne majus continet in se minus, the greater includes the lesser: the power to set aside an award includes the power to set aside part of it.
The majority recognised a limited power to modify an award in the following situations:
- where the invalid portion of the award can be severed from the valid portion;
- to correct clerical, computational or typographical errors apparent on the face of the record;
- to modify post-award interest in some circumstances; and
- through the Supreme Court’s own power under Article 142 of the Constitution, to be exercised with great caution.
Justice K.V. Viswanathan dissented, holding that Section 34 does not permit modification and that Article 142 should not be used to modify arbitral awards. Notably, the whole Bench accepted that a court may sever an invalid, separable part of an award.
What Gayatri Balasamy did not do is equally important. It did not convert Section 34 into an appeal. It gave the court a scalpel as well as an axe, but it did not lower the threshold for using either.
After Gayatri Balasamy: a sharper tool, the same high bar
The decisions since 2025 show courts continuing to protect arbitral finality. In Jan De Nul, a dredging dispute concerning the deepening of the channel at Tuticorin Port in Tamil Nadu, the arbitral tribunal had awarded the contractor about ₹14.66 crore for idle time of a dredger. A Single Judge of the Madras High Court upheld the award under Section 34, but a Division Bench set it aside under Section 37 on its own reading of the contract. The Supreme Court restored the award, holding that once a reasoned award interpreting a commercial contract survives Section 34, the Section 37 court cannot substitute its own interpretation.
In Jabalpur Corridor, the dispute arose from a 2003 build-operate-transfer concession for the Sagar to Damoh to Jabalpur road project in Madhya Pradesh. The award in favour of the concessionaire had been upheld under Section 34 and Section 37, and the State corporation’s appeal then remained pending in the Supreme Court for several years. A Bench of Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar dismissed the appeal. The Court described judicial review of awards as a narrowing pyramid, in which the higher the court, the lesser the propensity to interfere, and treated the tribunal’s reading of the termination payment clauses as, at the very least, a plausible view protected by concurrent findings. It also declined to reopen a jurisdictional objection that had been decided and exhausted earlier in the litigation, and directed release of the deposited amount to the award holder.
The scope of intervention today: five propositions
- The grounds are closed. A court can act only on the grounds in Section 34(2), together with patent illegality on the face of a domestic award under Section 34(2A).
- The court does not sit in appeal. It will not reweigh evidence or choose between competing plausible interpretations. The tribunal remains the master of the evidence and of the interpretation of the contract.
- Patent illegality is a demanding standard. It applies where a finding rests on no evidence, ignores vital evidence or is so irrational that no reasonable person could reach it, not where the court would simply have decided differently.
- The remedy now includes a scalpel. After Gayatri Balasamy, a court may sever an infirm and separable portion, correct obvious errors and, in some circumstances, revisit post-award interest. Severance is available only where the bad part is genuinely separable.
- Section 37 is narrower still. The appellate court checks whether the Section 34 court stayed within its limits and cannot enlarge the field of review. Where a party invokes the Supreme Court’s discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136, the threshold is higher again.
Practical guidance for businesses considering a Section 34 challenge
For Indian companies and multinational businesses arbitrating in India, the practical lesson is clear. Section 34 is not a rerun of the arbitration, and dissatisfaction with the result, however strongly felt, is not a ground for setting an award aside. A challenge should be built around a specific statutory ground, filed within the strict limitation period, and framed with an eye to whether any defect is severable. Award holders, for their part, can expect courts across India, from the High Courts of Delhi, Bombay and Madras to the Supreme Court, to look for reasons to uphold awards rather than to unravel them.
Key takeaways
- Section 34 is the exclusive remedy against an arbitral award (V.K. John, 2026); writ and revision routes are not available.
- Courts do not reappreciate evidence or substitute their own interpretation of the contract.
- Gayatri Balasamy (2025) permits severance, correction of obvious errors and limited modification of post-award interest, but not merits review.
- Under Section 37, review is narrower still (Jan De Nul, 2026; Jabalpur Corridor, 2026).
- A Section 34 application must be filed within three months, extendable by only thirty days.
Frequently asked questions
Section 34 Arbitral Award Challenge
Under Section 34(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: incapacity of a party, invalid arbitration agreement, lack of proper notice or inability to present the case, award beyond the scope of the submission, improper composition of the tribunal or procedure, non-arbitrable subject matter, and conflict with the public policy of India. For domestic awards, patent illegality on the face of the award is an additional ground under Section 34(2A).
Only to a limited extent. In Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd. (2025), the Supreme Court held that courts may sever invalid and separable parts of an award, correct clerical, computational or typographical errors, and in some circumstances modify post-award interest. It cannot review the merits.
No. Section 34(2A) expressly provides that an award shall not be set aside by reappreciation of evidence, and the Supreme Court has consistently held that the tribunal is the master of the evidence.
Three months from the date the applicant received the arbitral award, extendable by a further thirty days if the court is satisfied there was sufficient cause, but not beyond that.
No. In V.K. John v. S. Mukanchand Bothra and HUF (2026), the Supreme Court held that Section 34 is the exclusive remedy, including for a legal representative of a deceased party.
No. The Section 37 court only examines whether the Section 34 court acted within its limits. In Jan De Nul Dredging v. Tuticorin Port Trust (2026), the Supreme Court restored an award that a Division Bench had set aside by substituting its own reading of the contract.
Sources
- Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd., 2025 INSC 605 (Constitution Bench, decided 30 April 2025).
- Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corridor Pvt. Ltd., 2026 INSC 590 (Civil Appeal No. 10877 of 2018, decided 29 May 2026).
- V.K. John v. S. Mukanchand Bothra and HUF (Died) Represented by LRs, 2026 INSC 393 (decided 20 April 2026).
- Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust, 2026 INSC 34 (decided 7 January 2026).
- MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163; Dyna Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd., (2019) 20 SCC 1; UHL Power Company Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2022) 4 SCC 116; Project Director, NHAI v. M. Hakeem, (2021) 9 SCC 1; Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49; Ssangyong Engineering v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131.
- Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Sections 5, 34 and 37 (indiacode.nic.in).
- Reports in LiveLaw, LiveLaw Biz and Verdictum on the above judgments.
This article is intended for general information only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers should refer to the official text of the statutes and judgments discussed and seek advice on their specific circumstances.
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